According to calculations, to have enough 16.000 tons of rice to serve the soldiers in the Dien Bien Phu campaign, the logistics industry had to mobilize 384.000 tons, because for every kilogram of rice reaching the destination, 24 kilograms were eaten along the way.
In early 1954, after launching the Dien Bien Phu campaign, France with the support of the US poured more than 11.800 troops here, at peak up to 16.200, accounting for nearly 10% of the Northern army force, with a high amount of ammunition. more than 20% of this force's monthly consumption.
Dien Bien Phu became an "unassailable fortress" and a "giant hedgehog" in the middle of the Northwest mountains and forests. General Henri Navarre, General Commander of the expeditionary force in Indochina, believed that the Viet Minh could not concentrate more than two divisions and heavy artillery on the battlefield. Providing food, ammunition and other necessities to troops fighting for a long time, on roads that are always bombed by the French air force, is "impossible".
After summarizing the battles in the Northwest and Na San at the end of 1953, the Second Division (the intelligence department of the French army) calculated the carrying capacity of Vietnamese civilians and concluded: "The Army Corps Viet Minh combat operations cannot operate for a long time in an area lacking food, more than 18 km away from the base area.
Confident in "crushing" the Viet Minh if they intended to attack Dien Bien Phu, on Christmas Eve 1953, the Commander of the De Castries base group said: "We are only afraid that the Viet Minh will see the bait of Dien Bien Phu too much." big. If they are too afraid to attack, it will be disastrous for soldiers' morale! He sent airplanes to spread leaflets, challenging General Vo Nguyen Giap and his soldiers.
Accepting to fight the French army, the Vietnam People's Army (France called the Viet Minh army) saw the challenges when opening the Dien Bien Phu campaign. The battle line alone at its peak required more than 87.000 people, including 54.000 soldiers and 33.000 civilians. The amount of rice needed for this route is 16.000 tons.
Major General Nguyen An, former Deputy Director of the General Department of Logistics, once said that the source of supplies from the south is Thanh Hoa, the road is more than 900 km long, so for every kg of rice reaching the destination, there must be 24 kg of rice eaten along the way. In the Dien Bien Phu campaign, if transportation had to be carried out entirely by civilians, the 16.000 tons of rice needed to reach the destination would have to be multiplied 24 times, meaning 384.000 tons of rice would need to be mobilized from the people.
“If we want 384.000 tons of rice, we must collect and grind 640.000 tons of rice. It is assumed that if we collect anything, we will not be able to transport it in time because the distance is too far and the volume is too large," General Nguyen An said in the book. Dien Bien soldiers tell stories.
The campaign required 1.200 tons of weapons, with over 20.000 cannon bullets alone, total weight 500 tons. In addition, it is necessary to transport explosives, medicine, military supplies, etc., all of which are not gathered in one place but scattered throughout all regions. How to mobilize and transport large quantities of rice and ammunition to the front when there are only a few hundred cars?
Mobilizing rice on the spot, using bamboo to weave rice mills
With the spirit of "all for the front line", the Politburo and the Government encouraged the people of Son La and Lai Chau, two newly liberated provinces, to contribute rice to the soldiers and minimize long-distance transportation. If you have to ask for rice aid from China, choose the nearest source, if not, get it from further behind.
As a result, the people of Son La and Lai Chau contributed more than 7.360 tons of rice, equal to 27% of the total mobilized amount. China's rice aid from Yunnan shipped 1.700 tons and the logistics industry bought 300 tons of rice in the Nam Hu region (Upper Laos). The remaining 15.640 tons of rice had to be transferred from the rear, of which 6.640 tons were supplied to the front. The amount of rice eaten along the way was only 9.000 tons, which is only 2,4% of the original calculation.
Colonel Tran Thinh Tan, once the Platoon Commander of the General Department of Forward Supply, said that Northwest people contributed more than 10.000 tons of rice to the soldiers. This food source is very valuable because it is mobilized locally, but how to mill it into rice is a difficult question.
After many days of research, the General Department of Forward Supply decided to establish a "deputy army" to grind rice right on the battlefield. The "deputy mortars" were recruited from army and civilian units and dispatched from the rear. They went into the forest to cut bamboo, weave rope to make mortar jackets, split bamboo sticks to make wedges, and use bamboo to make poles. At first, the proportion of rice milled using bamboo mortars was low, but later increased.
To transport rice and weapons to the battlefield, the Government mobilized farmers from the free zone zone 4 (Thanh - Nghe - Tinh) and the temporarily occupied areas, a total of 261.135 people, contributing nearly 11 million. workday. From Son La to Dien Bien alone, there were 33.000 people, equal to 4,72 million workdays. They participated in road construction, used baskets, baskets, wheelbarrows, bamboo boats, bicycles and even buffaloes and horses... to transport goods for the campaign.
>>Dien Bien Phu - the strongest stronghold in Indochina 70 years ago
Citizens have improved ordinary bicycles into bicycles that can climb steep passes and carry hundreds of kilograms of goods. In total, the logistics industry mobilized nearly 21.000 bicycles, of which 2.500 were on the military route, each vehicle carrying an average of 180 kg, especially Mr. Cao Van Ty's bike in Thanh Hoa carried 320 kg, Mr. Ma's bike carried 352 kg. Van Thang in Phu Tho carried XNUMX kg.
General Vo Nguyen Giap in the book Dien Bien Phu is a historic rendezvous tells about the atmosphere of soldiers going to war: "Cart transport has become the second most important transport force, behind motor vehicles. The pack horses of the Mong people descending from high places, the working women of the Tay, Nung, Thai, and Dao ethnic groups add color to the endless picture. There were also herds of cows swaggering and pigs running around, under the patient leadership of supply soldiers, also going to the front."
General Navarre later had to admit: "In the area controlled by our army (ie the French army), the Viet Minh still has a secret authority. They collected taxes and recruited people. Here they carry a lot of rice, salt, cloth, medicine and even bicycles that are very effective in providing supplies...".
In addition to rudimentary means of transport, the Dien Bien Phu front was equipped with Soviet transport vehicles, at a peak of 628 vehicles, and the military logistics line alone had 352 vehicles. The Viet Minh also used two waterways to transport goods: the Red River from Phu Tho and Vinh Phuc and the Ma River from Thanh Hoa to Van Mai, Hoa Binh province and then continued by road to Dien Bien Phu. Both routes have mobilized up to 11.800 wooden and bamboo boats of all types.
Transporting from cannonballs to pipe tobacco for the soldiers
To attack Dien Bien Phu, cannons and bullets played an important role. Viet Minh has 105 mm bullets, but they are scarce while the quantity needed in the campaign is more than 20.000 bullets, total weight 500 tons. Transporting this ammunition to artillery positions in steep mountain pass conditions, under the control of the French air force, is a "brainstorming" problem. Because 11.715 rounds had to be taken from military depots in the rear, 500 to 700 km away from the front. This amount of ammunition has been saved for 4 years, since the Border campaign in 1950.
Because of scarcity, the protection of cannonballs was calculated in detail and carefully. Soldiers gathered bullets in a cave in Ban Lau, Son La province. At the fire line, the ammunition depots were dug deep into the mountainside, with wooden piles and planks arranged along the road... Thanks to discreet camouflage, although the French army continuously used reconnaissance planes to detect places where the warehouses were suspected to be located, they were not found. discovered.
At the front, soldiers grabbed parachutes of 105 mm bullets mistakenly dropped on the battlefield by a French plane, taking more than 5.000 bullets. The Chinese army also contributed 3.600 rounds to the campaign, accounting for 18% of the total ammunition consumed.
Besides ammunition, explosives, medicine, communication equipment, from radio to wired telephone, electrical wires... are all carefully prepared by the logistics industry. The information system is smooth, helping the Campaign Command to conveniently issue necessary orders.
According to the recollections of Major General Nguyen Minh Long, former Deputy Director of the Department of Operations, Staff Assistant in the Dien Bien Phu Campaign Command, to overcome the shortage of electrical wires, the soldiers removed all communication wires. of the Command with agencies and the rear to replace with bare wires, borrowing wires from Son La, Lai Chau, Hoa Binh post offices. The Department launched guerrillas in the enemy's rear area to remove the French army's ropes, sending soldiers to Na San base to dig up the enemy ropes and bring them to Dien Bien Phu for use.
The logistics industry has prepared the soldiers for every little thing. In the book Some recollections of Dien Bien Phu, Lieutenant General Hoang Cam, then the Commander of Regiment 209, Group 312, said that General Vo Nguyen Giap had directed the supply sector to prepare enough pipe tobacco, which most soldiers often smoked.
General Cam explained that pipe tobacco is not a basic issue in combat but is an indispensable practical need. At that time, the soldiers were mostly farmers, many of them were very addicted to smoking, and when they were addicted, they "buried the cigarettes and dug them up again". Without smoking, people are in a daze.
“Understanding that need, the Government and Uncle Ho instructed the rear to pay attention to taking care of the soldiers with pipe tobacco sent to the front, along with guns, ammunition, rice, salt and medicine. But due to the prolonged fighting, the lack of cigarettes is still a topical issue mentioned every day," General Hoang Cam recounted.
In the poor conditions of the resistance war, the Army Medical Corps stockpiled medicine to treat wounded soldiers, including wounded French soldiers taken as prisoners of war. Before the day of victory, the military medical sector built a lime kiln on site to prepare lime powder to clean the battlefield and sterilize the trenches where French troops were stationed. Just a few days after the end of the campaign, the battlefield no longer had a foul smell.
French General Yves Gras in the book History of the Indochina War wrote: "Mr. Giap believes that the entire nation will find a solution to the logistics problem and this solution has failed all the calculations of the French General Staff...".
The general commander of the expeditionary force in Indochina also had to admit: "The Viet Minh command has outlined their logistics work very well. We must acknowledge the great efforts of their people to support their army and admire the ability of the Command and the enemy Government to know how to be effective.
And French military historian, Dr. Ivan Cadeau, in the book Dien Bien Phu March 13-May 3, 7, has summarized all archived documents in the French Ministry of Defense and drawn the conclusion: "The French air force has never succeeded in hindering Viet Minh's logistics, even for just a few hours."
The strength of the logistics army contributed to the victory of Dien Bien Phu on May 7, 5.
Tien Long
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