Upholding digital sovereignty – Building national digital trust
Cyberspace is becoming a new "front" for national sovereignty as data, artificial intelligence, and digital infrastructure become increasingly intertwined with all aspects of the economy and social life. Against the backdrop of growing risks of cyberattacks, data leaks, and technological dependence, this series of articles in the special feature "Maintaining Digital Sovereignty – Building National Digital Trust" will delve into the challenges facing Vietnam on its journey to building a safe, self-reliant, and trustworthy digital nation.
In recent years, the world has witnessed numerous cyberattacks that have paralyzed airports, hospitals, power plants, financial systems, and global supply chains. Simultaneously, artificial intelligence is developing at a rapid pace, data is becoming a strategic resource, and quantum technology is beginning to pose a threat to traditional encryption standards. A nation may possess modern infrastructure and a rapidly growing digital economy, but if its citizens' data, operating systems, or critical infrastructure are controlled from the outside, a security vacuum will emerge in the very process of development.
In this context, Directive No. 57-CT/TW of the Party Central Committee, issued on the last day of 2025, reveals a new perspective on protecting the Fatherland in the digital space. From the requirement that "systems that do not ensure safety and security should not be put into use," to the orientation of developing core technologies "Make in Vietnam," and building a "people's security posture in cyberspace," Directive 57 does not merely address data security or cyberattack prevention in a technical sense. This document clearly reflects a larger demand: the need to erect new "defense shields" to safeguard national digital sovereignty during a period of deepening digital transformation.
Cyberspace has become a "soft border".
On May 22, 2026, at the Vietnam Security Summit 2026, Major General Nguyen Tung Hung, Deputy Commander of the Cyber Warfare Command, made a concise yet thought-provoking statement: "A nation cannot guarantee its digital sovereignty if it is entirely dependent on foreign technology." This was not just a theoretical warning.
Over the years, the world has witnessed a series of cyberattacks that have disrupted the operations of even technologically advanced nations. Some hospitals have had to temporarily suspend medical services because their data systems were encrypted. Airports, oil and gas systems, and financial corporations have had to cease operations for hours, even days. The damage extends beyond economic figures to psychological and social impact, shaking public confidence in the security of digital infrastructure.
In Vietnam, digital transformation is happening very rapidly. Population data, online public services, digital banking, electronic medical records, e-commerce, AI platforms… are becoming deeply integrated into almost every aspect of life. Tasks that once required in-person interaction are now handled online with just a few taps on a screen.
The more dependent society becomes on digital infrastructure, the greater the risk it faces if the system is attacked or data is leaked. Colonel Nguyen Hong Quan, Deputy Director of the Cyber Security and High-Tech Crime Prevention Department (A05, Ministry of Public Security), said that cybercrime groups are currently exploiting AI to create deepfakes that mimic voices and faces, spread malware, and organize targeted attacks on agencies, businesses, and individuals.
Many recent scams show that in just a few minutes of carelessness, users can lose all the money in their accounts. Numerous businesses have faced crises after customer data leaks or attacks that have caused system downtime. What worries experts even more are the risks that have yet to fully materialize.
At the Vietnam Security Summit 2026, Major General Nguyen Tung Hung mentioned the "collect first, decode later" strategy being pursued by many countries possessing quantum technology. Data could be silently collected today, waiting until decoding capabilities are strong enough in the future.
In other words, what is considered "safe" today may not be safe in a few years. As data becomes a core component of the digital economy, it will be linked to national security, control over infrastructure, and each nation's autonomy in cyberspace.
Directive 57 and warnings from the near future.
It is in this context that Directive No. 57-CT/TW, issued at the end of 2025, holds special significance. For the first time, cybersecurity, information security, and data security are placed in direct relation to national sovereignty, political stability, and the country's competitiveness.
The directive states: "Ensuring cybersecurity, data security, and information confidentiality is not only a technical task but also a matter of national security, national sovereignty, political and social stability, and national competitiveness."
This approach shows that cybersecurity is now viewed at the national security level, rather than just a technical or operational issue as it was before.
The issuance of Directive 57 coincided with Vietnam's most extensive digital transformation campaign to date. Following the restructuring and streamlining of the administrative apparatus and the implementation of a two-tiered local government model, the amount of administrative data, population data, and operational data of the political system has grown significantly, and the level of interconnectedness has become increasingly deep.
This creates great opportunities for administrative reform and improved governance efficiency. However, if these systems are attacked or data is leaked, the consequences will be far greater than before.
Directive 57 also directly addresses many existing shortcomings: a lack of synchronized digital infrastructure, many systems put into use without ensuring security, a shortage of high-quality human resources, and a low level of technological self-reliance. Therefore, the requirement that "systems that do not ensure safety and security must not be put into use" can be seen as a significant change in the thinking about digital development.
For many years, in numerous places, deployment speed has often been prioritized, while cybersecurity protections have been added later. Only after incidents occur do people try to fix and patch vulnerabilities. This approach might be acceptable during the initial transition phase, but it becomes very risky once data and digital infrastructure become the foundation of both governance and the economy.
Meanwhile, AI and quantum technology are narrowing the gap between offense and defense much faster than before.
While cyberattacks used to require considerable preparation time, AI can now automatically scan for vulnerabilities, create malware, and emulate voices or images with a high degree of sophistication. Supply chain attacks, attacks on cloud platforms, data centers, or AI systems are becoming a real threat in many countries.
Digital sovereignty cannot stand on borrowed technology.
One of the issues frequently discussed at the Vietnam Security Summit 2026 was the increasing reliance on foreign technology. According to Major General Nguyen Tung Hung, most current systems utilize cross-border cloud computing platforms, imported network equipment, and core technologies from abroad. This allows for rapid deployment and cost optimization, but also carries the risk of losing control over data and becoming dependent on external suppliers.
That story is not unique to Vietnam.
In recent years, the world has witnessed fierce competition surrounding semiconductor chips, AI, data, and digital infrastructure. Data is seen as a new strategic resource, while core technologies are increasingly linked to national standing.
Therefore, when Directive 57 emphasized the motto "self-reliance, self-sufficiency, and self-strengthening" in building cybersecurity potential and developing Vietnam's cybersecurity product ecosystem, prioritizing mastery of core technologies, this has become a practical requirement of the development process.
The directive also sets out very specific directions such as researching quantum-resistant cryptographic algorithms, developing "Make in Vietnam" security chips, and prioritizing the use of domestic cybersecurity products in public investment projects.
This also brings pressure to achieve greater self-reliance in technology and data infrastructure. Without mastering the underlying technologies and data infrastructure, protecting digital sovereignty will always face an insurmountable gap.
Another point emphasized in the Directive is the building of a "people's security posture linked to a national defense posture in cyberspace."
This shows that cybersecurity is no longer the sole responsibility of specialized forces. Technology companies, telecommunications companies, financial institutions, banks, and even internet users are all becoming part of the defense system.
In reality, many successful online scams don't stem from overly complex techniques. A simple fake link, an AI-generated voice call impersonating a relative, or an unverified social media account can cause significant damage.
Perhaps that is why Directive 57 devotes a significant amount of space to building a "generation of digital citizens," integrating cybersecurity knowledge into the national education system, addressing "junk" SIM cards and "fake" accounts, and implementing national cyber identity and authentication.
This is also a story about social trust in the digital environment. When people no longer feel safe in online transactions, when true and false information are blurred, and when personal data is constantly at risk of illegal exploitation, the foundation of the digital society will also be affected.
When "shields" are no longer just a matter for the tech industry.
One noticeable change in Directive 57 is the significant shift in thinking about cybersecurity. No longer focused on post-incident response, the Directive calls for a "proactive defense," identifying threats early and from afar, and preparing corresponding defensive capabilities.
Based on that orientation, a series of tasks were set out: building a national cybersecurity risk management framework according to international standards; forming a multi-layered national cybersecurity protection architecture; and expanding monitoring connectivity to all national databases and information systems of the entire political system.
From the business perspective, many experts also believe that cybersecurity needs to be considered right from the system design stage. Mr. Mai Xuan Cuong, a representative from Viettel, warned that as AI agents become increasingly involved in business operations, risks related to data access, model monitoring, and AI behavior control will become much more complex.
Meanwhile, Nguyen Tuan Khang, head of IBM's Data & AI division in Southeast Asia, emphasized that data governance and AI model monitoring will determine the reliability of AI systems in the future.
These warnings indicate that the competition ahead is not simply about who has the more powerful technology. The ability to protect data, safeguard digital infrastructure, and maintain social trust is the true measure of each nation's resilience in the digital age.
Therefore, maintaining digital sovereignty is no longer solely the responsibility of specialized forces or technology companies. As government administration, business operations, financial transactions, education, healthcare, transportation, and more shift to the digital environment, cybersecurity becomes an integral part of life security.
In the coming years, cyberattacks may become far more sophisticated due to the influence of AI and quantum technology. But perhaps the biggest challenge lies not in malware or invisible intrusions, but in whether a nation has the capacity to protect its own data, infrastructure, and the trust of its society.
As life, governance, and the economy all shift to the digital environment, national sovereignty is also expanding into a new "frontier region." There, every database, every technology platform, every identification system, and every online transaction is directly related to the security and resilience of the nation.
In this context, the ability to protect the digital space will increasingly become a measure of each nation's resilience and governance effectiveness. Digital sovereignty is therefore no longer solely a matter for the technology industry or cybersecurity forces, but is directly linked to the competitiveness of the economy and the sense of security that citizens can experience every day in the digital environment.
From demographic data, electronic identification, cloud infrastructure, and "Make in Vietnam" AI to the challenge of protecting users from increasingly difficult-to-identify risks in cyberspace, Vietnam is entering a phase where the need for technological self-reliance and protecting digital trust will become more urgent than ever.
And behind these "defense shields" put in place today lies the requirement to ensure that the digital space does not become a new risk zone for development, but rather a place where people can live, work, and place their trust in the country's digital future with peace of mind.
Source: https://congluan.vn/can-nhung-la-chan-phong-thu-moi-post349928.html
