A historic decision

The Dien Bien Phu fortified complex was an "impregnable fortress." Therefore, the attack on Dien Bien Phu was "the largest-scale offensive in the history of our army to date" - an extremely arduous but also very glorious task.

A historic decision

General Vo Nguyen Giap's working and resting hut in Muong Phang (Dien Bien Phu City).

In reality, Dien Bien Phu was not initially a strategic decisive battleground in the Navarre Plan, the plan of the French expeditionary forces in Indochina (from May 1953). However, having grasped the movement direction of our main forces towards the Northwest, Navarre decided to choose Dien Bien Phu to build an "impregnable fortress," ready to attract and crush our main forces if we "dared to attack." However, it was "a gamble of all or nothing," as author Bernard B. Fall put it.

Because, immediately after the enemy paratroopers landed at Dien Bien Phu, the Central Committee of the Party and President Ho Chi Minh recognized that the enemy's organization of Dien Bien Phu as a fortified complex presented a good opportunity for us to annihilate their elite forces. Therefore, along with offensives on multiple fronts to disperse, hold back, and wear down the enemy's forces, we also proceeded to closely monitor and encircle the enemy at Dien Bien Phu and prepare for this important battlefield. The Central Committee of the Party decided to establish the Party Committee and Command of the Dien Bien Phu Front, with Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap, a member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party, directly serving as the Secretary of the Party Committee and Commander-in-Chief of the Front.

In fact, through campaigns and offensives on all fronts, especially during the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring campaign, our troops had already gained experience in attacking fortified positions. However, to counter the complex of fortified positions that the French were very confident were "impregnable," a suitable fighting method was required, given the limited operational and tactical capabilities of our army.

For the Battle of Dien Bien Phu, choosing the "quick attack, quick victory" strategy would have offered several advantages. Our troops were in high spirits; the fighting wouldn't be prolonged, minimizing the risk of attrition and fatigue. The campaign's short duration meant that food and ammunition supplies could be reliably secured without major obstacles. However, the "quick attack, quick victory" strategy also had a significant disadvantage: our troops, despite being prepared ideologically and tactically for attacking a fortified complex, lacked practical experience. The Battle of Dien Bien Phu was also our first time attacking a fortified complex, and we encountered a very strong one.

Entrusted with a difficult but noble task by the Party and President Ho Chi Minh , before going to the front lines, Uncle Ho instructed the General: "This battle is important; we must fight to win. Only fight if victory is certain; do not fight if victory is uncertain." Following his ideology, after continuously monitoring and analyzing the enemy situation and our capabilities, the General concluded: "Holding firmly to the principle of fighting for certain victory, we have determined that, given the situation where the enemy's fortified positions are no longer in a temporary occupation state, a 'quick attack, quick resolution' would not guarantee victory. Therefore, we have resolutely determined the campaign's motto to be 'fight surely, advance surely'."

The shift from a "quick attack, quick victory" strategy to a "steady attack, steady advance" strategy was the "most difficult decision in the General's military career." To make that decision, the General spent 11 sleepless nights and one night without eating or drinking; he also had to persuade and gain the consensus of the Advisory Board, the Party Committee, and the Front Command. It was a historic decision, ensuring the "certain victory" of the Dien Bien Phu campaign.

Following the principle of "attack surely, advance surely," the Dien Bien Phu campaign was not a single large-scale, continuous battle against the enemy in fortified positions over a short period. Instead, it was a large-scale offensive campaign, but one consisting of a series of battles against the enemy in fortified positions, continuing over a considerable time, concentrating superior forces to destroy the enemy piece by piece, ultimately leading to the complete annihilation of the enemy stronghold. However, conducting the campaign according to the principle of "attack surely, advance surely" also presented many new difficulties and obstacles. The longer the campaign lasted, the more the enemy reinforced their fortifications and could bring in reinforcements. On our side, prolonged operations could lead to troop depletion and fatigue, but the greatest difficulty remained the supply and resupply.

However, the strategy of "attack surely, advance surely" guaranteed victory because it suited the capabilities of our troops. Furthermore, this strategy allowed us to maintain complete control over the timing and location of attacks. Simultaneously, it allowed us to exploit the enemy's weakness in supply lines if we controlled the airfield. In addition, this strategy created favorable conditions for other battlefields to inflict more enemy casualties, expand liberated areas, and coordinate better with the main Dien Bien Phu battlefield.

“Here, I want to clearly distinguish between an accurate combat decision and the resolute fighting spirit of the army. An accurate combat decision is a combat strategy that fully demonstrates revolutionary and scientific principles, stemming from a correct and comprehensive assessment of both sides. The resolute fighting spirit, on the other hand, is the army's courageous determination to fight, its resolve to complete all assigned tasks. It must be said that the resolute fighting spirit is one of the decisive factors in achieving victory in war. But the resolute fighting spirit alone is not enough. The resolute fighting spirit can only fully exert its effect on the basis of an accurate combat plan, a correct determination regarding campaign and tactics, and realistic capabilities in organization and command. When there is a correct revolutionary line, then the revolutionary method is the decisive issue. When there is a correct combat strategy, then the combat method is the decisive issue. That is one of the main contents of the art of command” – General Vo Nguyen Giap Armor.

Recalling this decision, in his work "Dien Bien Phu," the General said: "We resolutely determined the campaign's motto to be 'fight surely, advance surely.' That decision required immense determination, a determination to firmly grasp the principle of fighting surely to win in directing the operation; a determination to mobilize all forces to overcome countless difficulties and obstacles to ensure victory for the campaign."

Adhering to the principle of "attack surely, advance surely," in directing the preparatory work, we focused on both aspects: thorough preparation and seizing the opportunity. In particular, we emphasized preparation in all areas, especially preparing new routes for artillery and preparing artillery positions and firing techniques; preparing the troops in terms of material and morale, technical and tactical skills; and continuously monitoring and studying the enemy situation, especially changes in their troop strength and deployment in the center... From there, we overcame disadvantages or concerns about troop fatigue and attrition; the supply and resupply of food and ammunition; and adverse weather conditions...

And in fact, the shift in strategy and the effective application of the motto "fight surely, advance surely" proved to be the foundation and prerequisite for the Dien Bien Phu campaign to complete victory.

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