Victory News April 10, 1975: Continuing to attack and control Xuan Loc town

On April 10, 1975, the Secretariat issued Circular No. 312-TT/TW on propaganda of victory, encouraging emulation with the South, and achieving many new victories.

It emphasized: "The rapid development of the southern revolution poses many new requirements that need to be resolved. The victories in the south are stirring up a vibrant revolutionary spirit throughout the country. It is necessary to quickly and widely announce the news of victory, and to deeply mobilize the entire Party, the entire army, and the entire people to make everyone clearly see the significance of the victory and their responsibilities in the new situation, contributing the greatest efforts to the common revolutionary cause of the nation."

Also on April 10, the Saigon-Gia Dinh Liberation Campaign Command met to discuss and agree on leadership and command methods and campaign combat plans.

Our army expanded its attack into Xuan Loc town and controlled many enemy posts. (Photo: VNA)

The Command determined: "We must concentrate our forces and technical weapons, promote our combined strength, create an overwhelming advantage to quickly destroy and disintegrate all remaining enemy troops, smash the Saigon army from the Central to the grassroots, liberate Saigon-Gia Dinh, and create conditions for liberating the South. During the campaign, we need to closely combine the offensive and the uprising of the masses, but the military offensive must go one step ahead and play a decisive role."

On the same morning, continuing the Xuan Loc-Long Khanh campaign, our units continued to break through Xuan Loc, captured the airport, heavily damaged the 3rd Regiment of the 18th Division of the ARVN, and attacked the 1st Airborne Brigade that had just landed in Tan Phong. The enemy had to send the Special Forces Group to reinforce Xuan Loc. We changed the way we fought: surrounded Xuan Loc, and attacked the reinforcements.

In Military Region 9, because Xuan Loc had not been completely defeated, on April 10, 1975, the Regional Command called Military Region 9 to cancel the plan to attack the airport and Can Tho city, so the Military Region called Division 4 to turn back. However, the unit was pursued by the enemy and suffered losses of the entire reconnaissance platoon.

In Military Region 8, from April 10 to 12, 1975, the Standing Committee of the Regional Party Committee and the Military Region Party Committee met to thoroughly grasp the tasks assigned by the superiors, discuss the organization plan, assign tasks to implement the general offensive-general uprising plan, and highly agreed and deeply understood the three tasks assigned by the superiors:

• Strategic division: Completely cut off Route 4 and Cho Gao canal.
• Launch an attack into southern Saigon, capture the National Police Headquarters (1 of the 5 major targets of the campaign).
• Free the whole area.

The Standing Committee of the Regional Party Committee and the Military Region Party Committee determined that "this is a heavy and urgent task, with some unforeseen tasks (such as attacking Saigon), but it is also an honor and a great responsibility to directly participate in the liberation of Saigon".

On April 10, 1975, the Navy Command dispatched three transport ships 673, 674, 675 (Regiment 125) from Hai Phong to Da Nang to prepare to liberate the islands in the Truong Sa archipelago held by the Republic of Vietnam army.

On the same day, the entire force of the 99th Bridge Regiment, 473rd Engineering Division, Truong Son Command, advanced eastward, securing a number of bridges on Highway 1 to Da Nang and the Cau Lau, Ba Ren, An Tan, and Ke Xuyen bridges with Belay equipment and steel beams captured from the enemy, ensuring our main force could quickly advance to liberate Saigon.

In the history of the resistance war against America to save the country, the Saigon Liberation Campaign mobilized the highest level of military transport vehicles, with 42,000 tons of vehicles.

The entire military transport force of 120,000 people (80% of the campaign logistics force), 6,300 transport vehicles of Group 559, 2,100 vehicles of the Transport Department and hundreds of vehicles of army corps, military branches, military services, military regions... were mobilized.

A large state transport force, including more than 1,000 cars, 32 ships (5,000 tons of vehicles), 130 train cars (9,000 tons of vehicles) and hundreds of tons of air vehicles were mobilized to transport troops and facilities to the battlefield. That is not to mention more than 400 private transport vehicles and passenger cars in the newly liberated areas also participated in the campaign.

Vtcnews.vn

Source: https://vtcnews.vn/ban-tin-chien-thang-10-4-1975-tiep-tuc-tien-cong-kiem-soat-thi-xa-xuan-loc-ar936750.html