Central Highlands Campaign

By 1974 , through the operations of our army and people on the battlefield, the situation of the Saigon puppet army in the South became increasingly passive and confused in terms of combat and force building, while American aid decreased, leading to a decline in equipment and combat strength of the main forces of the Republic of Vietnam.

On our side, from the end of 1973 to the beginning of 1974 , the army and people in the South continued to achieve very important victories on the military, political , and counter-pacification fronts, thereby creating new momentum and strength for the struggle for national reunification. By January 1975, the Politburo and the Central Military Commission met and made a strategic decision to liberate the South within two years, 1975-1976. At the same time, we also planned an extremely important option: "If the opportunity arises at the beginning or end of 1975, we will immediately liberate the South in 1975." Determining the strategic direction of attack and the specific tasks of each battlefield, the Politburo demanded that we proactively seize the strategic opportunity and prepare for combat on both strategic fronts: the Central Highlands (with the focus on the Southern Central Highlands) as the important and main strategic direction; and the Southeastern region as the final decisive direction. Capturing the Central Highlands would create a chain reaction and favorable conditions for us to organize subsequent campaigns, strategically dividing the enemy and rapidly advancing towards Saigon.

On January 9, 1975 , the Standing Committee of the Central Military Commission met to discuss and implement the Politburo's Resolution on the Central Highlands Campaign. At the meeting, the intention to liberate Buon Ma Thuot became clearly defined, and the Central Highlands Campaign was officially launched with the codename "Operation 275".

The Central Highlands was a strategically important region, so the enemy paid close attention to military operations aimed at suppressing the revolutionary movements of the three Indochinese countries, preventing our support from the North and from the mountainous areas down to the plains. Along Highway 14 was a system of military bases, including divisional and corps-level bases, firmly organized into a basic defensive line that formed the core of the enemy's defense system in the Central Highlands.

The enemy forces in the Central Highlands consisted of the 2nd Corps of Military Region 2 (headquarters located in Pleiku) and reinforcements including the 23rd Infantry Division, 7 commando battalions, 36 security battalions, 1 armored brigade, 230 heavy artillery pieces, and 1 air force division. Prior to the opening of the campaign, the enemy concentrated 8 out of 10 regiments in the northern Central Highlands (Pleiku, Kon Tum), while the southern Central Highlands (especially Buon Ma Thuot) was considered a rear area, with a thinner force deployment.

After deciding to launch the Central Highlands Campaign, the Politburo and the Central Military Commission decided to establish the Party Committee and Command of the Central Highlands Campaign and appointed Lieutenant General Hoang Minh Thao as Commander and Colonel Dang Vu Hiep as Political Commissar and Secretary of the Campaign Party Committee. The Party Committee of Zone 5 assigned Comrade Bui San, Deputy Secretary of the Zone Party Committee, and Comrade Nguyen Can, Secretary of the Dak Lak Provincial Party Committee, to accompany the Campaign Party Committee and Command to directly supervise the provinces and coordinate closely with the main forces in preparation and combat. A representative body of the Military Commission and the General Staff, chaired by General Van Tien Dung, was also stationed in the Central Highlands to directly supervise the campaign.

Our forces participating in the campaign included infantry divisions (10, 320, 316, 3 and 968); four infantry regiments (25, 29B, 271, 95A); the 198th Special Forces Regiment; two special forces battalions (14, 27); two artillery regiments (40, 675); three anti-aircraft regiments (232, 234, 593); the 273rd Armored Regiment; two engineering regiments (7, 575); the 29th Communications Regiment; the Motor Transport Regiment and the armed forces of Dak Lak, Kon Tum and Gia Lai provinces.

Source: https://baodaknong.vn/chien-dich-tay-nguyen-249264.html