Shattering the enemy's "steel shield" of Phan Rang.

The victory at Phan Rang affirmed the powerful strike capability, mobility, and combined arms offensive capabilities of the Liberation Army; it contributed to changing the balance of power on the battlefield, creating favorable conditions and opportunities for our army and people to accelerate the final strategic general offensive against the enemy's stronghold in Saigon .

In March 1975, after losing the Central Highlands and the Central region, with American advice, the puppet President Nguyen Van Thieu ordered General Cao Van Vien, Chief of Staff of the puppet army, to establish a defensive line at Phan Rang to protect Saigon from afar and also to protect his hometown of Ninh Thuan, where Nguyen Van Thieu was born. General Cao Van Vien assigned this task to Lieutenant General Nguyen Van Toan, Commander of Military Region 3 - 3rd Corps of the puppet army. Because Toan was directly defending Xuan Loc, he established a forward command post of the military region at Thanh Son airfield (Ninh Thuan) and assigned Lieutenant General Nguyen Vinh Nghi, Deputy Commander, to be the Commander of the forward command post.

Liberation Army tanks capture the puppet regime's administrative building in Ninh Thuan province, April 16, 1975. (Archival photo)

After studying the situation in Phan Rang, in early April 1975, Nguyen Vinh Nghi drafted a very strong defense plan for Phan Rang, equivalent to two infantry divisions, along with a tank regiment, armored vehicles, and numerous artillery positions; notably, Thanh Son airfield had more than 50 aircraft of various types providing support; and warships at Ninh Chu estuary were ready to provide reinforcements. There were only two routes to Ninh Thuan: Highway 1 connecting to Khanh Hoa province in the north, passing through Du Long district (the main route), and Highway 11 from the northwest connecting to the Central Highlands. Both sides of the roads were bordered by high, rugged mountains. General Nguyen Van Toan likened Du Long district to a strategic pass, "one man can defeat a thousand." Here, they deployed a defensive line stretching over 20km, from Du Long district to Phan Rang town, supported by a paratrooper brigade, a commando regiment, and a tank and armored vehicle detachment. Furthermore, enemy aircraft could intercept the enemy from Khanh Hoa to Phu Yen ; their long-range artillery could fire as far as Cam Ranh. The entire enemy force, numbering tens of thousands, was equipped with powerful firepower and had a tightly organized, interconnected defense on advantageous terrain. Therefore, they were confident in blocking our advance at the gateway to Phan Rang. According to Nguyen Vinh Nghi's assessment, the Liberation Army was far from the rear lines and needed to consolidate newly captured areas, so even with the fastest possible pace, it would take at least 20 days before they could resume their offensive.

On our side, we thoroughly understood the Politburo 's determination to completely liberate South Vietnam in April 1975. With the resolve of "speed, boldness, surprise, and certain victory," on the morning of April 7, 1975, departing from Da Nang, the Coastal Army, commanded by Commander Le Trong Tan, divided into five rapid-progressing blocks, advanced southward along National Highway 1. With the power of an offensive "one day equals 20 years," in a very short time, the Liberation Army swiftly covered a long distance, quickly approaching the enemy's Phan Rang defense line. On April 10, the leading force of the army reached Cam Ranh, while the remaining blocks were on their way to North Cam Ranh as planned. At the same time, from April 8 to 11, the 3rd Division - Golden Star - deployed its entire force north of Phan Rang town, ready to attack the enemy. On the morning of April 14, the 3rd Division opened fire and attacked the enemy's Phan Rang defense line. After two days of fierce fighting, the 3rd Division captured several targets along National Highway 1 and surrounding areas such as Du Long district town, the 105 and 300 high points, Ba Rau, Suoi Vang, Suoi Da, and destroyed several outposts on the outskirts of Thanh Son airfield.

With the timely arrival of forces from the 2nd Corps, along with the 3rd Division, three prongs were quickly formed. The first prong penetrated deep, primarily along National Highway 1 into the center of Phan Rang town, then coordinated with the 3rd Division to capture Thanh Son airfield. The second prong captured the An Phuoc and Phu Quy district capitals and pursued the remaining enemy forces. The third prong coordinated the capture of Ninh Chu and Tan Thanh ports to prevent the enemy from escaping to the sea. With a surprise and daring attack using combined arms strength, on the afternoon of April 16th, the Liberation Army completely took control of Thanh Son airfield, shattered the "steel shield" of Phan Rang, and completely liberated Ninh Thuan province.

The offensive on Phan Rang, carried out with the combined arms force of the Coastal Army, was a resounding victory. We annihilated and captured the entire Forward Command of the 3rd Military Region of the puppet army (including Lieutenant General Nguyen Vinh Nghi and Brigadier General Pham Ngoc Sang); destroyed and dispersed the 6th Air Force Division, the 2nd Infantry Division of the puppet army; the 2nd Parachute Brigade, the 31st Commando Regiment, and all enemy forces in the Ninh Thuan sub-region... We shot down many enemy A37 aircraft; sank 3 warships; captured 40 intact aircraft; dozens of M113 armored vehicles and M48 tanks; 60 artillery pieces along with many other technical equipment and war vehicles; completely liberated Phan Rang town and Ninh Thuan province with 320,000 inhabitants; and simultaneously contributed to crushing the US-puppet regime's plot to prevent our forces from advancing and consolidate their position in Saigon-Gia Dinh.

The crushing of the "steel shield" at Phan Rang demonstrated the Liberation Army's ability to seize opportunities and quickly adapt to changing battlefield situations; especially through studying the enemy-friendly situation, terrain, and weather to devise a scientific and effective combat plan. Although the enemy forces were numerous and equipped with modern weapons, they had to be spread thinly, requiring high mobility in defense... If we could control Thanh Son airfield, contain their artillery and mortar positions, and organize a rapid, strong, relentless, and unexpected attack, the enemy forces at Phan Rang would be thrown into disarray and collapse. Based on scientific analysis, the Coastal Army Command decided to implement an offensive while on the move, coordinating various branches of the armed forces to attack directly into Phan Rang town, then fanning out in other directions to capture other targets, annihilating all enemy forces at the Phan Rang defense line and liberating Ninh Thuan. The victory at Phan Rang created a leap forward in strength and momentum for our army. At the same time, it encouraged and motivated the fighting spirit of the army and people on their way to liberating Saigon-Gia Dinh.

NGO HOAI DONG - PHUNG VIET ANH

* Please visit the section commemorating the 50th anniversary of the great victory of Spring 1975 to view related news and articles.

Source: https://baodaknong.vn/dap-tan-la-chan-thep-phan-rang-cua-dich-250270.html