General Syrskyi's mistake in the battle north of Pokrovsk

General Syrskyi's mistake in the "all-in" counterattack gamble north of Pokrovsk caused the Ukrainian 93rd and 12th Azov Brigades to fall into the Russian fire trap.

In recent military operations, the Commander-in-Chief of the Ukrainian Army, General Syrsky, has once again staked his personal reputation on a risky counterattack. In order to relieve the relentless Russian pressure on Dobropilya, north of the city of Pokrovsk, he has mobilized the most capable combat units of the Ukrainian Army (AFU) for this counterattack.

The AFU units participating in the counteroffensive, including the 12th Azov Independent Assault Brigade and the 93rd Assault Brigade, aimed to regain key positions such as the villages of Stepy, Rubizhne and Kucheriv Yar, as well as control of the T-0514 road… through a large-scale counteroffensive. Thereby restoring the supply route from Karamatorsk to Pokrovsk, in order to reverse the situation.

In theory, if this plan were successful, it would not only break the Russian Armed Forces' (RFAF) "Trident Offensive" in Pokrovsk and Konstantinivka, but also potentially break the Russian encirclement formed through the Dobropillia salient.

However, the reality of the battlefield never followed the arrows on the maps of the AFU staff officers. In fact, the AFU counter-offensive campaign not only failed, but also fell into the fire trap carefully arranged by the RFAF.

According to the operational plan, the 93rd AFU Special Forces Brigade was ordered to launch an attack south from the town of Shahove, forming a pincer movement with the 12th Azov Brigade; with the intention of encircling the Russian 132nd Brigade. However, General Syrsky overlooked the most important terrain factor, which must always be taken into account when developing an operational plan.

Shahove is a "bowl" with high elevations on all sides and a low center, which puts it at a natural disadvantage. When the 93rd AFU Brigade entered this area, they lost their ability to maneuver. As expected, the Russian multiple rocket launchers and Su-34 fighters, the coordinates of which were calculated in advance, immediately launched a massive attack using cluster munitions, engulfing the entire area in dense smoke and fire.

Shahove, located in a low position, was no longer a springboard, but a “fire trap” for the AFU. Under heavy artillery fire, many Ukrainian soldiers could only hide in hastily dug shelters, but Russian blockade fire had almost cut off all avenues of retreat. At this point, the 93rd Brigade had completely lost the ability to attack and had become a “trapped unit” in dire need of rescue.

The 12th Azov Brigade faced a similar situation, when one of its battalion, which was assembling north of the village of Sofiivka in preparation for an attack on Kucheriv Yar, stopped for a while in a forest belt. However, their movements were accurately tracked by Russian reconnaissance UAVs.

Immediately dozens of FAB-500 and FAB-1500 guided bombs rained down, turning the entire forest belt into a sea of ​​fire and almost completely destroying the Azov battalion. The pincer attack hastily planned by General Syrsky collapsed immediately.

This victory meant that the AFU not only failed to encircle the Russian 132nd Brigade, but also lost two of its core assault units. In military terms, the Battle of Shahove was a prime example of the successful RFAF strategy: "lure the enemy deep into the defensive area, then destroy it with fire".

The RFAF’s tactical logic was clear: first, use the terrain to lure the Ukrainians into a “trap” in low-lying areas, then suppress them with carpet-laying artillery fire and powerful guided bombs. Finally, cut off the enemy’s escape routes and carry out concentrated bombing campaigns with the air force.

General Syrsky's fatal flaw was his impatience. He hoped to reverse the general defensive situation by creating a hasty tactical breakthrough north of Pokrovsk, but he relied too much on his so-called "elite strike brigade".

Meanwhile, the AFU had significant shortcomings in fire support, air defense and terrain adaptability. As a result, the 93rd Brigade and the Azov Brigade, due to the lack of ground and air fire support, when having to fight outside fortifications, became easy prey for Russian fire.

Now, not only could the AFU not relieve the pressure on the Dobropillia salient, but it also had to exhaust its most valuable mobile forces. If the 93rd Brigade could not break through, the defense line north of Pokrovsk would become even more precarious.

For the RFAF, this battle had a double benefit: tactically, they destroyed a large number of elite Ukrainian troops; strategically, they prevented any Ukrainian counterattack attempts, forcing them to be passive in the Pokrovsk and Konstantinovka directions.

In the future, the RFAF could use Dobropillia as a breakthrough point to further tighten Ukraine’s defenses in the Donbass, or even to apply pressure towards Dnepropetrovsk. The bloody battle for Shahove once again demonstrated that war is not simply about spirit and courage; it is a comprehensive test of terrain, firepower, intelligence and command.

General Syrsky’s “all-in” gamble not only consumed a large number of AFU’s elite troops, but also pushed them deeper into a passive defense; while the RFAF continued to gain the initiative. The most important thing for General Syrsky now is whether the AFU can hold its position or not? (photo source Military Review, Rvvoenkory, Ukrinform).

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