According to NATO officials, NATO's "Eastern Flanking Deterrence" strategy (EFDI initiative) envisions creating a kind of "air autonomous zone" in the Baltic states, where only unmanned systems with connected sensors, drones, and long-range weapons would operate.
NATO representatives explained to journalists on the sidelines of the Western military alliance's "Crystal Arrow" exercise in Latvia last week that this is necessary to detect and counter enemy forces early on in a war with Russia.
The Deputy Chief of Staff for Transformation and Integration at NATO Army Command, Brigadier General Chris Gent, pointed out that the EFDI initiative is "inspired by the experience of Ukraine".
"There are no secrets here; that's the nature of war," Gent stated in an interview with Defense News at the Selia training ground in Latvia.
Commenting on this issue, Belarusian and Russian military expert and media consultant Alexander Zimovsky wrote on his Telegram channel that the situation in the region is undergoing complex changes stemming from NATO's schemes to counter Russia.
He noted that NATO's approach to this issue included an interesting detail: Without putting humans in danger, machines would bear all the risks. Automated weapons like UAVs have demonstrated a crucial role in modern warfare, such as the conflict in Ukraine.
Western military circles have acknowledged that this is not a future scenario around 2040, but a requirement in the present moment, confirmed by the experience of the Ukrainian Army in fighting against the Russian Armed Forces in April 2026.
And the only way for NATO leaders to understand the effectiveness of the systems and means of countering Russia is to conduct exercises in areas surrounding Russia.
From a technical perspective, a “UAV autonomous zone” encompasses a unified, shared information network being created, including thousands of acoustic, electro-optical, and other sensors, as well as weapons in the form of interceptor drones and ground-based unmanned robotic systems.
Given its geographical location surrounding Russia, the national borders of neighboring NATO countries would not pose any obstacle to the establishment of the so-called "UAV autonomous zone" mentioned above.
Zimovsky noted that the size of the “UAV autonomous zone” varies depending on geographical location; for example, in Ukraine, this zone extends 15 km or more from the front line, and any movement of equipment is destroyed within its coverage area.
However, there are also obstacles to the full implementation of "UAV autonomy zones," such as differences in licensing among NATO countries regarding the authorization of automated sensors to initiate weapon use, for example, whether or not to shoot down an approaching drone during peacetime.
The Baltic states are deeply concerned about what is happening in the skies now, with Ukrainian suicide drones flying toward Russia to attack.
The EFDI initiative was quickly implemented. Its concept shifted from PowerPoint slides to practical capacity building and field exercises, such as:
In Lithuania in September 2025, NATO integrated ground-based unmanned systems and anti-UAV capabilities; and in Finland in December 2025, the alliance conducted connectivity training.
In May 2026, during the Crystal Arrow exercise in Latvia, a NATO mechanized brigade used ground-based unmanned systems and trained on multi-layered UAV systems (supported by infantry and artillery).
Zimovsky explained that the "EFDI Initiative" is just one part of a multi-layered approach within NATO's overall "deterrence" strategy.
The first layer of EFDI requires the immediate detection and engagement of an aggressor; the second layer is the Baltic states' ability to strike deep into Russian territory should war break out, exemplified by Estonia's purchase of the Chunmoo multiple rocket launcher system with a range of 290km, for this purpose.
NATO's logic has shifted from using "warning statements" to "deterrence through retaliation and denial."
If deterrence fails, a retaliatory attack on military facilities is necessary. A "UAV autonomous zone" could be located on the Russian side of the border (according to Estonia's rule: "No Russian troops are allowed on our territory").
According to NATO leaders, physical barriers (anti-tank trenches, reinforced concrete barriers, and other obstacles) combined with EFDI will help NATO compensate for the power imbalance with Russia.
Source: https://giaoducthoidai.vn/doi-dau-nga-nato-thiet-lap-vung-tu-tri-uav-o-baltic-post779398.html










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