70 years of Dien Bien Phu victory: General Giap's decision to change the situation on the battlefield

During the Dien Bien Phu campaign, General Vo Nguyen Giap had to make the 'most difficult decision of his military career', but it was also a decision that had decisive significance in the victory or defeat of the campaign.

Plan to destroy Dien Bien Phu base in 3 days and 2 nights

On the morning of April 4, in Ninh Binh , the 12th Army Corps and the People's Army Newspaper organized a seminar on "Military art in the Dien Bien Phu Campaign - Practical lessons in current combat training". Speaking at the seminar, Major General, Dr. Nguyen Hoang Nhien, Director of the Institute of Military History ( Ministry of National Defense ), said that by early December 1953, the Dien Bien Phu battlefield had become a strategic battle point between us and the French colonialists. In mid-December 1953, the French colonialists had concentrated 12 battalions in Dien Bien Phu, gradually forming a strong and solid base group to crush our main force divisions.

General Vo Nguyen Giap and his commanding officers met to discuss the battle plan for the 1954 Dien Bien Phu Campaign.

According to Senior Lieutenant General, Associate Professor, Dr. Tran Viet Khoa, Director of the National Defense Academy (Ministry of Defense), for the French army, the Dien Bien Phu stronghold with a large army, strong firepower, and a solidly built, complete system of fortifications and obstacles was the newest and most modern form of defense. This was a "giant, indestructible fortress" that General Giap would "not dare to accept to fight" because the Viet Minh army had never attacked such a large stronghold. If they attacked Dien Bien Phu, they would be on the path of suicide. On December 6, 1953, the Politburo met and determined to destroy the Dien Bien Phu stronghold to create a new turning point in the war. General Vo Nguyen Giap   was assigned the task of Commander and Party Secretary of the Dien Bien Phu campaign. On January 5, 1954, he left for the front. In his speech sent to the discussion, Mr. Khoa acknowledged that General Vo Nguyen Giap, along with President Ho Chi Minh , the Politburo, and the General Military Commission, did not underestimate the strength of the French colonialists in Dien Bien Phu. Our Command clearly recognized that the Dien Bien Phu stronghold was a target with a large number of troops, overwhelming firepower, and solid fortifications. However, the problem for the Command in general and General Vo Nguyen Giap in particular was not not daring to attack where the enemy was strong, but how to attack to destroy such a strong stronghold.

Major General, Dr. Nguyen Hoang Nhien, Director of the Institute of Military History (Ministry of National Defense), spoke at the seminar.

On January 12, 1954, at Tuan Giao, General Vo Nguyen Giap listened to the report of the Chief of Staff of the campaign, Hoang Van Thai. The Party Committee of the Front and everyone agreed with the campaign motto of "fight fast, win fast". Chinese advisor Vi Quoc Thanh also affirmed that if we did not take advantage of the early attack while the enemy was still not firmly established, and let them increase their troops and consolidate their fortifications tomorrow, we would not be able to attack and we would lose the opportunity. Colonel Tran Lien, former staff officer of the 367th Anti-Aircraft Regiment in 1954, who directly participated in the Dien Bien Phu campaign, recounted the initial plan when the enemy had just gathered in Dien Bien Phu with 6 battalions, so the campaign was based on the motto of "fight fast, win fast", expecting to destroy the Dien Bien Phu stronghold in 3 nights and 2 days. "At that time, there was a plan to manually pull the artillery 15 km of mountain forest road from Na Nhan (Dien Bien district) on Highway 41 through Pha Phu Xong mountain to Tau village on Lai Chau road, Dien Bien. It was expected to be pulled by 5,000 officers, engineers and infantry battalion 174 in one day and night," said the 96-year-old colonel.

The most difficult decision in General Vo Nguyen Giap's military career

However, in the face of the enemy's increased defense and after many days of monitoring, General Vo Nguyen Giap realized that the enemy in Dien Bien Phu had become a solid defensive stronghold. Meanwhile, our artillery, the main firepower of the campaign, could not be brought into the battlefield on time and as required. If we "attack quickly, resolve quickly", then victory would not be guaranteed.

Leaders of the 12th Corps Command with Colonel Tran Lien (4th from left) and Mr. Vo Hong Nam (son of General Vo Nguyen Giap, 2nd from left ) at the discussion.

Colonel Tran Lien, former staff officer of Anti-Aircraft Regiment 367 in 1954, gave a speech at the seminar.

According to Senior Lieutenant General Tran Viet Khoa, at the Front Party Committee Conference on January 26, 1954, General Vo Nguyen Giap, Secretary of the Front Party Committee, asked the Party Committee members to answer a core question at that time: is fighting like this 100% certain to win? After many hours of discussion, General Vo Nguyen Giap concluded: Fighting according to the motto "fight fast, win fast" is certain to fail and decided to switch to the motto "fight steady, advance steady".

Major General, Dr. Tran Minh Tuan, Deputy Director of the Institute of National Defense Strategy, said that after many days and nights of closely following the battlefield, considering all aspects, based on the analysis and comparison of the balance of forces, and assessing the capabilities of our side and the enemy at Dien Bien Phu, the General came to a decision that we must resolutely change the way of fighting immediately, shifting from "fight fast, win fast" to "fight firmly, advance firmly". On the morning of January 26, 1954, General Vo Nguyen Giap met with the head of the Chinese advisory delegation, Wei Guoqing. After about half an hour of discussion, advisor Wei Guoqing agreed with the General's analysis and assessment and agreed to postpone the attack, switching to the motto of "fight firmly, advance firmly". Immediately after that, the Party Committee Conference of the Front was convened to discuss the change in the combat motto. The conference discussed and debated very frankly. At the conference, there were also opinions opposing the change in the combat motto at first. However, as a Commander-in-Chief, the General analyzed scientifically and raised the issue of ensuring "sure victory before fighting" as decided by the Politburo and Uncle Ho's advice to him: "This battle is very important, we must fight to win. Only fight if sure victory, not fight if not sure victory". Finally, the Party Committee of the Front also found consensus on the issue of changing the decision from "fight fast, win fast" to "fight sure, advance sure". The General ordered the entire front to postpone the attack, the units retreated to the assembly point, pulled out the artillery, and prepared again according to the new combat strategy. Later, General Vo Nguyen Giap shared that changing the strategy from "fight fast, win fast" to "fight sure, advance sure" was "the most difficult decision in his military career". If he kept the old order, it would be a crime. "This was a wise decision with a sharp personal military perspective, bravery, courage, decisiveness, boldness, and insight, demonstrating a very high sense of responsibility for the victory of the campaign and the blood of the officers and soldiers of the commander and was the decisive factor in ensuring the victory of the Dien Bien Phu campaign," Senior Lieutenant General Tran Viet Khoa assessed. Implementing the newly proposed motto and combat plan, after more than 2 months of careful preparation in all aspects, at 5:00 p.m. on March 13, 1954, our army opened fire to attack the Him Lam stronghold, opening the Dien Bien Phu Campaign. After 56 days and nights, after 3 attacks, by 5:30 p.m. on May 7, 1954, the Dien Bien Phu stronghold was completely destroyed. General De Castries and the entire General Staff and soldiers of the Dien Bien Phu stronghold had to surrender. According to Colonel, Associate Professor, Dr. Tran Ngoc Long, former Deputy Director of the Institute of Military History, the developments on the battlefield during the next 56 days and nights showed that changing the combat strategy from "fight fast, solve quickly" to "fight steadily, advance steadily" was "timely and wise, and had decisive significance in the victory or defeat of the Dien Bien Phu campaign". source