The cargo bicycle in the Dien Bien Phu campaign.

The Dien Bien Phu victory is one of the most glorious achievements in the history of the Vietnamese people's struggle against foreign invaders in the 20th century. The Dien Bien Phu victory was the triumph of the all-encompassing, protracted, and arduous resistance war of the Vietnamese people under the leadership of the Party and the great President Ho Chi Minh .

Long lines of carts on the road to the campaign. Photo: VNA

The land of Dien Bien Phu was once abundant and rich, truly a place where "good land attracts good birds." Le Quy Don, a renowned historian of the 18th century, wrote in Kien Van Tieu Luc: "This region, surrounded by mountains and bordered by rivers, has a military outpost in the middle, and its flat, fertile fields extend to the foot of the mountains, requiring a day's journey. Farming here is half the work of other regions, and the yield is double." On May 7, 1954, this place witnessed the resounding victory of our army and people after fifty-six days and nights of digging tunnels, sleeping in bunkers, enduring torrential rain, eating meager rations, and blood mixed with mud – the Dien Bien Phu victory.

The roads stretch endlessly.

In this historic victory, one of the key factors was the contribution of manpower and resources from our entire army and people, overcoming all difficulties and hardships to ensure good logistics, providing food, medicine, and other necessities for the troops on the front lines.

Through major campaigns such as the 1950 Border Campaign and the 1952 Northwest Campaign, our army clearly saw the role of infrastructure and roads in warfare whenever a major campaign was launched. General Vo Nguyen Giap, in his book "Dien Bien Phu: A Historical Rendezvous," stated that we had restored and expanded 4,500 km of roads, including over 2,000 km for motorized vehicles. At the beginning of the Dien Bien Phu campaign, we only repaired the roads from Tuan Giao to Lai Chau ; and the section from Tuan Giao to Dien Bien Phu (later known as Road 42). In particular, the Tuan Giao - Dien Bien Phu road, 89 km long, was narrow, with many sections damaged by landslides, and over a hundred bridges and culverts were damaged. It had to be widened sufficiently not only for transport vehicles but also for artillery towing. When the strategy shifted to "attack cautiously, advance steadily," a new requirement arose: constructing a road for transporting artillery by truck from kilometer 62 to the battlefield, a distance almost equal to the road from Tuan Giao to Dien Bien Phu, traversing extremely rugged mountainous terrain.

A convoy of bicycle carriers on their way to the campaign. Photo: VNA

Boats navigate rapids to deliver supplies to the front lines. Photo: VNA.

During World War II, in Myanmar, the US military, with its advanced infrastructure, took 18 months to hastily construct a 190-kilometer road (Ledo Road) under conditions free from enemy obstruction. We, on the other hand, had only a very short time to build 160 kilometers of road right on the front lines, under constant bombing and artillery fire, with only shovels, picks, and a small amount of explosives at hand.

We also focused on exploiting river routes. This was an important supply route, but so far it had not been exploited much because the river had too many dangerous rapids. We had experience overcoming the rapids on the Ma River during the Upper Laos campaign. After a period of using explosives to break up the rapids, the carrying capacity of the rafts increased threefold, and the number of people operating the rafts was reduced from three or four to just one. The young women from Thanh Thuy, Phu Tho, who were initially very afraid of the rapids, later each operated a raft downstream.

The power of cargo bicycles

General Navarre once remarked: "General Giap's forces would be unable to obtain the necessary weapons, ammunition, and food supplies. Carrying thousands of tons of supplies, traversing hundreds of kilometers of dense jungle to resupply a fighting force of approximately 50,000 men, is an insurmountable challenge."

At the front lines, where motorized vehicles were inaccessible, the primary method was still to rely on civilian laborers carrying supplies on foot. The roads to the front lines, riddled with bomb craters and overgrown with withered vegetation, were silent and deserted during the day, only coming alive at sunset. Groups of people flowed like a river towards the front lines, their voices echoing everywhere, expressing their determination to overcome all difficulties and their support for those fighting on the front.

Under the direct guidance of the Frontline Supply Councils, our entire army and people overcame all difficulties and hardships to ensure the supply of food and ammunition to the front. We primarily used motorized transport but did not forget to utilize rudimentary means of transport such as: handcarts, horse-drawn carts, ox carts, wheelbarrows, rafts, etc. Handcarts accounted for 80% of the campaign's logistical needs. Handcarts were mobilized to their maximum capacity, reaching up to 20,000 vehicles.

Mr. Bui Tin's cargo bicycle, used by a civilian worker from Thanh Hoa province to transport food and weapons for the Dien Bien Phu campaign in 1954. Photo: Pham Dong

A cargo bicycle can carry an average of 50 kg to 100 kg, equivalent to the carrying capacity of 5 people, is faster, and can transport bulky materials and liquids such as gasoline and oil.

Initially, each bicycle cart carried 100 kg, but later, through continuous competition, the load increased to 200-300 kg, with a record of 352 kg carried by a single bicycle cart, set by civilian worker Ma Van Thang (Phu Tho Detachment).

It can travel on many different types of roads and terrains that cars cannot. Some advantages of cargo bicycles include not needing fuel, ease of repair, camouflage capabilities, and the ability to travel independently or in groups in all weather conditions. Cargo bicycle units are usually organized into local groups, with each group consisting of several platoots, and each platoon having 30 to 40 bicycles. The bicycles are divided into groups of about 5 to support each other when climbing steep hills or slopes. In addition, each cargo bicycle group also has a special vehicle to carry spare parts and repair tools when needed.

The productivity of bicycle carriers was more than ten times higher than that of laborers carrying supplies on foot; the amount of rice needed for the carriers along the way was also reduced by the same amount. Another advantage of bicycle carriers was their ability to operate on routes inaccessible to automobiles. This mode of transport caused a great surprise to the enemy, disrupting their previous calculations.

As the campaign drew to a close, convoys of cars, boats, horse-drawn carts, and especially tens of thousands of bicycles from the liberated areas, newly liberated Northwest regions, and areas behind enemy lines, enthusiastically traversed forests and streams to serve the front lines. Our army and people's supply lines stretched for hundreds of kilometers from Thanh Hoa and Phu Tho to the Northwest, with civilian laborers traversing mountains and forests, navigating treacherous mountain passes day and night, providing an endless supply of goods to the front lines through enemy aircraft.

All for the front lines, all for victory.

Responding to the call of the Central Committee of the Party and President Ho Chi Minh, the entire army and people of Vietnam concentrated their human and material resources to support the Dien Bien Phu front. Through combined strength, unity, and a shared determination to overcome difficulties and hardships, the young Democratic Republic of Vietnam, under the leadership of the Communist Party of Vietnam, achieved final victory.

This frontline support effort demonstrated the achievements of the eight years of resistance. The rear not only met the highest demands for personnel and resources for the front lines but also remained ready to fight and defend itself if the enemy attacked while the troops were on the front. The people of Nghe An, Ha Tinh, and Quang Binh provinces were assigned to serve in the Central and Lower Laos campaigns. This front alone mobilized 54,000 civilian laborers, contributing nearly two million man-days of work, over two thousand bicycles for transport, and fifteen hundred boats.

In the North, Thanh Hoa became the main supplier province for the campaign. Thanh Hoa provided the majority of manpower and resources for the final general offensive against enemy positions, ensuring the success of the offensive. The number of civilian laborers mobilized from Thanh Hoa in the third phase of the campaign reached a record high: 120,000 people, including 25,000 female laborers. In all three phases, Thanh Hoa mobilized 178,924 long-term and short-term civilian laborers for the campaign, nearly 70% of the total civilian laborers for the entire campaign. Thanh Hoa was also the place where most of the wounded and sick soldiers were raised, cared for, and treated, and was also the center for the re-education of a large number of prisoners of war transferred from the Dien Bien Phu front.

In general, there were many reasons for the victory of the Dien Bien Phu campaign, among which one important and decisive reason was the enormous support from the rear, both materially and spiritually. For the enemy, their defeat had many causes, including their failure to fully anticipate the supply capabilities of our rear for the front lines. In the book "The Tragedy of Indochina," French authors wrote about General Navarre's mistake: "He believed that the Viet Minh could not supply Dien Bien Phu; if they wanted to reach there, they would consume four-fifths of the food supplies, and moreover, his air force could destroy the supply lines." Ivon Panhinet, a French scholar, in his book "Eyewitnesses in Vietnam," recorded the lament of a French officer: "Alas! Our planes were outmatched by the Viet Minh's civilian laborers!"

Laodong.vn