“The great Battle of Dien Bien Phu has been recorded in the history of the nation as a Bach Dang, a Chi Lang, or a Dong Da in the 20th century; and has gone down in world history as a glorious victory, a breakthrough against the stronghold of the colonial system of imperialist enslavement” (General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam , Le Duan)
General De Castries, who directly commanded the Dien Bien Phu fortified complex and the French military headquarters that surrendered – the Dien Bien Phu campaign was a complete victory. (Image reproduced in the Panorama painting, part of the Dien Bien Phu Historical Victory Museum).
With the construction of the most powerful fortified complex in Indochina at Dien Bien Phu, the French colonialists viewed it as "a trap or a crushing machine, ready to crush the enemy's steel divisions." Understanding the French colonialists' intention to draw our main forces there to destroy them, then launch an attack on us, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Party resolved to completely annihilate the enemy forces at the Dien Bien Phu fortified complex. At the same time, President Ho Chi Minh instructed: "This campaign is an important campaign, not only militarily but also politically, not only domestically but also internationally. Therefore, the entire army, the entire people, and the entire Party must concentrate their efforts to ensure its success." With the slogan "All for the front, all for victory," the Vietnamese people poured all their strength and resources into this historic campaign. By early March 1954, all preparations were complete.
On March 13, 1954, our troops launched the first offensive against the Dien Bien Phu fortified complex. After five days of fighting, we swiftly destroyed two of the enemy's most fortified strongholds, Him Lam and Doc Lap; routed another enemy battalion and destroyed the Ban Keo stronghold. We killed and captured 2,000 enemy soldiers, shot down 12 aircraft, opened a gateway to the center of the fortified complex, threatened the Muong Thanh airfield, and dealt a stunning blow to the morale of the enemy troops.
The fighting was intense and fierce beyond the enemy's expectations. On March 16, 1954, they deployed three paratrooper battalions to reinforce the Dien Bien Phu fortified complex. By March 30, 1954, we launched our second offensive, simultaneously attacking the eastern hills of the central sector. In the eastern sector, we eliminated 2,500 enemy soldiers, seized most of the important high points, consolidated our positions from above, and created conditions for dividing, encircling, and controlling the enemy, transitioning to a general offensive to annihilate them.
“Comparing the forces between us and the enemy in March 1954: In terms of troop numbers, the enemy had 444,900 troops, we had 238,000 troops; artillery, the enemy had 594 guns, we had 80; tanks and armored vehicles, the enemy had 10, 6, and 10, we had 0; aircraft, the enemy had 580, we had 0; warships, the enemy had 391, we had 0.” |
Faced with this situation, the French colonialists concentrated most of their fighter and transport aircraft in Indochina to reinforce the Dien Bien Phu front. At the same time, the US imperialists urgently reinforced France with 100 fighter-bombers, 50 transport aircraft, and lent France 29 C119 aircraft with pilots; they also established an airlift to transport paratroopers from Japan and the US to the Dien Bien Phu front. The US imperialists also sent two aircraft carriers into the Gulf of Tonkin to practice a "massive landing in Indochina."
On our side, through two phases of fighting, our forces were continuously strengthened. Our troops made extraordinary efforts, fought bravely, and achieved many brilliant victories. However, due to the continuous, prolonged, and fierce fighting, and the increasing difficulties in supply and logistics, negative thoughts arose, along with fear of casualties and fatigue. Following the Politburo's directive, a widespread political campaign was conducted from Party committees to branches, from officers to soldiers in all units across the entire front. Negative right-wing ideology was deeply criticized, and the spirit of radical revolution and the determination to fight and win were strongly promoted.
Based on that training session, on May 1, 1954, we launched the third offensive, successively capturing the remaining strongholds in the East and West, and breaking the enemy's counterattacks. By May 7, 1954, our troops raised the flag of victory, advancing straight into the enemy's command post, capturing General De Castries and the entire staff of the Dien Bien Phu fortified complex. After 55 days and nights of incredibly heroic fighting, the historic Dien Bien Phu campaign was a complete victory. We annihilated and captured 16,200 enemy soldiers; seized 28 artillery pieces, 5,915 large and small guns, 3 tanks, 64 automobiles, 43 tons of communication equipment, 20 tons of military medicine, 40 tons of canned goods, 40,000 liters of gasoline and oil, and shot down 62 aircraft of various types...
The Dien Bien Phu Campaign was the largest combined-arms offensive campaign of our army during the resistance war against French colonialism. This victory decisively contributed to the failure of the French colonialists' Navarre Plan and American intervention. At the same time, it was a decisive victory for the nine-year long, arduous, yet incredibly heroic, resilient, and indomitable resistance war against France waged by our army and people. Dien Bien Phu has inscribed a glorious milestone in the history of the nation and the era, becoming a symbol of Vietnamese heroism and strength, a great achievement in the history of the nation's resistance against foreign invaders, and an inspiration for the anti-colonial and national liberation movements around the world.
The "earth-shattering" victory led many foreign scholars to exclaim, "Dien Bien Phu is the Valmy of the Black peoples"; or "In the world, the Battle of Waterloo had less of a resounding impact. The fall of Dien Bien Phu caused terrible horrors, signaling the disintegration of colonies and the end of the republic. The thunder of Dien Bien Phu still echoes."
When analyzing the reasons for the French defeat at Dien Bien Phu, the author of "Dien Bien Phu - A Corner of Hell," Bernard B. Fall, argues: "According to Navarre, sacrificing besieged units allowed the French to gain time and achieve victory. There is no doubt that if the Dien Bien Phu problem were entered into a computer, it would provide the same solution as Navarre's. This military theorist did not understand that losing the most elite units of the expeditionary force meant that the fighting spirit of the Indochinese soldiers would collapse and the will of the mother country to continue the war would be lost. Currently, none of this explains how Navarre could have once believed that nine infantry battalions, of which only three were truly elite, could hold out in a hastily constructed fortified complex against an attack by three Viet Minh divisions possessing unprecedented firepower in Indochina." And that, “it seems that what Nava and his staff intended to do at Dien Bien Phu was to turn it into a second Na San, a larger-scale Na San, where the French would ultimately win due to their superior firepower on land and in the air. Underestimating the strategic mobility and logistics of the Viet Minh in this way was certainly the only real mistake Nava made in preparing for the 1954 spring campaign. But it was a strategic mistake, and its consequences were also strategic.”
“During the war of aggression against Vietnam and Indochina (1945-1954), the French Republic had 20 overthrown prime ministers, 7 changes in the High Commissioner, and 8 changes in the commander-in-chief of the French expeditionary forces in Indochina. France mobilized a large number of personnel and war expenses: in 1954, the number of French and puppet troops reached 440,000, of which 72% were puppet troops; the war expenses of the 9 years of war amounted to nearly 3 trillion francs, of which US aid accounted for about 1.2 trillion francs (equivalent to 2.7 billion dollars). In 1954 alone, US aid accounted for 73.9% of the war expenses. The number of French soldiers killed, wounded, and captured was nearly 600,000.” (According to “The Vietnamese Revolutionary War 1945-1975: Victories and Lessons”). |
With the advantage of a powerful fortified complex, the French colonialists were confident of a "happy ending" at Dien Bien Phu. However, that confidence ultimately came at a very high price, as Dien Bien Phu became "a corner of hell" for them. De Castries, who was directly in command of the Dien Bien Phu fortified complex, bitterly realized the reason for their defeat: "One can defeat an army, but one cannot defeat a nation." The glorious victory at Dien Bien Phu, a triumph that astonished humanity, is an epic tale of one of the greatest feats of the 20th century. This victory is also the most powerful and convincing evidence of the truth of the Ho Chi Minh era: "Nothing is more precious than independence and freedom," and the unstoppable determination of our nation and people: "We would rather sacrifice everything than lose our country or be enslaved!"
Text and photos: Le Dung
(This article uses material from the book "Chronological History of the Communist Party of Vietnam, Volume III: The Party's Leadership in Resistance and National Construction (1945-1954)", National Political Publishing House).
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