The diminutive Trần Dynasty soldiers defeated the Yuan cavalry.

Tran Hung Dao's strategy when dealing with a powerful enemy.

Drawing from the story of Mr. Tran Duy Khang - the caretaker of A Sao Temple - and several books on the military art of Hung Dao Dai Vuong Tran Quoc Tuan, we wish to give readers an idea of ​​the Dai Viet army of the Tran dynasty - described in folklore as having an average height of 1.5 meters - fighting and defeating the powerful Yuan-Mongol cavalry that spread terror across a large part of Europe and Asia.

Mr. Tran Duy Khang is always proud that his ancestor - An Sinh King Tran Lieu - the father of National Hero Tran Quoc Tuan, established a settlement in A Sao. He said that the stories he told us about the A Sao estate, about the time Tran Hung Dao stayed there, as well as stories about the innovations in weapon manufacturing and fighting methods, are oral traditions passed down from the elderly members of his family.

In the 13th century, the Mongol-Yuan cavalry was the most formidable fighting force on both the European and Asian continents. In the book " Tran Hung Dao - A Military Genius " (National Political Publishing House - 2000), authors Trinh Vuong Hong, Phan Dai Doan, Nguyen Danh Phiệt, Nguyen Canh Minh, and Le Dinh Sy argue that, aware of their weaknesses – inferior equipment compared to European cavalry and less organized than the Song Dynasty army – the Mongol-Yuan cavalry strived to overcome these shortcomings by using their numerical advantage to overwhelm the enemy. They also deployed horizontal battle formations across a wide front, divided into multiple lines, continuously charging and attacking from the front as well as flanking maneuvers to break through the enemy's defensive positions.

Mongolian cavalry and their equipment. (Photo: Genk.vn).

On the vast, dry terrain of the expansive grasslands and barren hills of the central highlands, the skilled and highly tactical Mongol regular cavalry unleashed their full power. The authors of this book quote Peng Deya of the Song Dynasty, author of the book "Black That Su Luoc" (Brief History of the Black That): “ In terms of tactics, they excelled in open field warfare; they wouldn't advance unless there was an advantage… A hundred cavalrymen circling could encircle ten thousand men; a thousand cavalrymen spreading out could stretch for a hundred miles… When the enemy splits, they split; when the enemy unites, they unite. Therefore, cavalry was their advantage, whether near or far, numerous or few, gathered or scattered, visible or hidden, appearing as if falling from the sky, moving like lightning… ” This power sowed terror and death even in distant regions of Europe and Asia.

However, those advantages and superior strength on the European battlefield became a fatal weakness when the Mongol army invaded Dai Viet due to the unsuitable terrain and the tactical prowess of the Tran dynasty's army, which included many well-trained military units.

Facing such a seasoned and brutal enemy, the authors of the book: " Tran Hung Dao - a military genius " believe that Tran Quoc Tuan brought the naval forces to participate in the battle with the motto "using short to counter long". Through the Battle of Bach Dang and many other battles, as well as through retreats or counterattacks, Tran Quoc Tuan and the generals of the Tran dynasty demonstrated their talent in combining infantry and naval forces. Naval warfare was a glorious tradition of the Dai Viet navy from Bach Dang (938) to Dong Kenh (1077).

Recognizing the limitations of cavalry in the wars of 1258 and 1285, the Mongol army deployed additional naval forces in 1288. However, their naval forces could not compare to those of Dai Viet, and in some aspects were even inferior to naval forces previously defeated by our army, such as the Southern Han and Northern Song navies of the 10th century.

According to the authors, on the battlefield, Tran Quoc Tuan did not employ a straight-line defensive formation. Instead, he often used a mobile, rapidly changing formation, such as having a cavalry unit fight on the front, drawing the enemy to an advantageous terrain where there was close coordination between infantry and cavalry, positioned in a scattered formation like an ambush, attacking the enemy's flanks.

When the Mongol army wanted to launch a large-scale attack, we launched smaller attacks; when the enemy tried to concentrate their forces, we dispersed them, forcing them to fight according to our tactics. When the enemy was weakened, we counterattacked, organizing large, unexpected battles that the enemy could not prepare for or concentrate to counter.

This method of warfare proved even more effective when enemy cavalry advanced into the central plains and lowlands. No matter how skilled the cavalry, it was extremely difficult for them to maneuver in such muddy terrain, crisscrossed by numerous rivers. Indeed, "when cavalry reached areas with lakes, ponds, and swamps, they had to stop."

The authors of the book conclude: It is clear that the principle of close cooperation between the land and naval forces in the Battle of Bach Dang led to our army's tremendous victory. In this battlefield, our naval forces skillfully deceived the enemy, luring them into an ambush and destroying a portion of them, allowing the infantry ambushing on both banks to play a decisive role in destroying the entire large fleet under the command of O Ma Nhi.

Professor of History Le Van Lan stated that many people overlook the detail that it was fire attacks that destroyed the enemy's ships.

“ The stakes in the river didn't pierce the boats; they only served to hinder their movement, causing congestion. When the fleet was no longer able to move or operate, the fire attack began to take effect… That was the ingenuity of Tran Hung Dao ,” Professor Le Van Lan affirmed to a VTC News reporter.

The authors of the book argue that in Dai Viet, Tran Quoc Tuan, as well as the Tran dynasty, did not advocate developing cavalry to counter cavalry, as some contemporary military strategists believed. During the Tran dynasty, infantry was considered the primary type of military force, and its heroic traditions were further developed in close combat, ambushes, raids, and creating strategic advantages in warfare.

Alongside infantry were elephant troops and cavalry, which, although not yet specialized or developed into independent branches, always fought effectively in coordination with infantry. War elephants, with their superiority, became a terror to invading armies whenever they encountered them.

During the Tran Dynasty, war elephants participated in battles such as Binh Le Nguyen, Noi Bang, and Van Kiep, trampling infantry and disrupting enemy cavalry. Although Dai Viet's cavalry was not numerous, they were often used unexpectedly in coordinated combat or when pursuing enemy forces.

In particular, the Đại Việt navy was an elite force with a tradition of riverine warfare and naval prowess. Originating from a coastal region and possessing a fondness for martial arts, the Trần dynasty was acutely aware of the importance of rivers, seas, and the navy. Lê Phụ Trần (also known as Lê Tần), a high-ranking military officer who made significant contributions to the 1258 resistance, was appointed Grand General of the Navy. Trần Khánh Dư, trusted by Trần Quốc Tuấn, was given the position of deputy general, guarding the Vân Đồn sea area, establishing a naval base, and organizing the first independent naval units – the Bình Hải army.

The Trần Dynasty's warships, both large and small, included many types, among which were the most modern of the time, such as the Châu Kiều ship, the Đinh Sắt ship, the Trung ship for transporting supplies, and the Cổ Lâu ship, each with hundreds of oarsmen capable of long-distance voyages and well-equipped. The sailors, called "trạo nhỉ" teams, were formed from fishermen familiar with the river and sea, and therefore were very skilled swimmers and naval combatants.

The naval forces of Tran Quoc Tuan at Van Kiep, commanded by the two Tran kings, were equipped with thousands of warships and participated in many important battles during the resistance against the Yuan-Mongol invaders.

Binh Le Nguyen (1258) - the first clash between the army and people of the Tran dynasty and the fierce invading army from Mongolia, commanded by Ulaan Khop Thai. (Photo: Zing.vn).

Returning to the story of the temple caretaker Tran Duy Khang, the Mongol soldiers of that time averaged 1.7 meters in height, were large, had strong horses, and used bronze shields. The soldiers of the Dai Viet army were only about 1.5 meters tall, mostly small and thin; they could fight and capture shields but couldn't hold them properly. Tran Quoc Tuan's generals devised a way to create shields to protect against arrows, but they had to be lightweight for mobility and agility.

From then on, shields made of paper (a type of paper used for writing Chinese characters, known for its toughness) were equipped for the Trần dynasty army. This paper was combined with silk harvested from the forest, lacquer, and the resin of the *Cypress* tree (a type of tree whose astringent fruit was commonly used by the people to dye clothing). Each layer of paper was interwoven with layers of silk, a layer of lacquer, and a layer of *Cypress* resin powder.

Each shield was made from 14-16 layers of paper. Shaped like a boat, it covered the soldier from below the knees to the top of the head. Not only did it protect against arrows and swords, but the shield could also be used as a boat to travel on water. This type of shield played a crucial role in the Trần Dynasty army's victory over the Mongol invaders.

Our army's swords were no match for the enemy, so Hung Dao Dai Vuong had a type of staff made, similar to a club, with one end nearly 1.5 feet long (about 45cm) and the other end over 2 feet (about 70cm), both covered in iron. Holding the shorter end to deflect the longer end prevented arrows from hitting the enemy. Conversely, holding the longer end to strike the shorter end resulted in a direct hit to the enemy's head.

Legend has it that when leading his army into battle, Tran Hung Dao's greatest concern was how to provide food and drink. During combat, it was impossible to stop the boats to eat, nor could cooking, as the smoke would easily reveal their location. Someone offered him a plan to allow the Tran army to fight for ten days without needing resupply. The plan involved pounding sticky rice cakes and wrapping them in boiled meat, which the soldiers carried on their backs. When thirsty, they could drink river water. This plan ensured the Tran army had enough food and strength to fight continuously.

Meanwhile, the Trần dynasty's army and people implemented the "empty gardens, deserted houses" order. The people were ordered to poison their food and drinking water. In addition, in the third lunar month of 1288, the weather became extremely hot, causing widespread illness and severe weakening of the enemy troops.

Along with building a multi-component military force (including the imperial army, local troops, royal troops, and militia), the Tran dynasty implemented the "Stationing troops in agriculture" policy. According to authors Trinh Vuong Hong, Phan Dai Doan, Nguyen Danh Phiệt, Nguyen Canh Minh, and Le Dinh Sy, this policy helped the state ensure a balance between the standing army and the reserve army; in peacetime, it was still strong enough to defend the country, and in wartime, it mobilized a large army, conducting people's war, with the entire population as soldiers.

During the Tran Dynasty, as Phan Huy Chu said, "the army numbered less than 100,000," but during the resistance against the Yuan-Mongol invaders, the court sometimes mobilized 200,000-300,000 troops to fight the enemy.

"Sending troops into agriculture," a practice dating back to the Ly-Tran dynasties, is a distinctive feature in the art of organizing and building armed forces by our ancestors.

Tran Quoc Tuan, like other generals of the Tran dynasty, placed great importance on training generals and soldiers. The military academy was a high-level school during the Tran dynasty; there, the king, along with princes and generals, studied military treatises, strategies, and how to set up and break formations. Tran Quoc Tuan compiled military treatises to serve as research and teaching materials. Studying military treatises and strategies was mandatory for the king, crown prince, princes, and high-ranking military generals. Tran Quoc Tuan demanded that generals diligently study military strategy, especially the "Essentials of Military Strategy."

During the preparations for the resistance against the Yuan-Mongol invaders, King Tran issued a decree entrusting Tran Quoc Tuan with organizing martial arts training. Many martial arts training centers appeared throughout the country; the atmosphere in the army was one of enthusiastic study of military strategy and martial arts practice.

The Tran kings, the royal family, and especially the generals in the court studied battle tactics and counter-tactics day and night, practicing horsemanship, swordsmanship, and archery. The state encouraged the establishment of martial arts training centers and allowed princes and members of the royal family to command and supervise the training of troops in their respective territories. Soldiers were trained in horsemanship, archery, and the use of various white-uniformed weapons such as swords, spears, and javelins.

Source: https://vtc.vn/linh-trieu-tran-nho-tho-danh-bai-ky-binh-nguyen-mong-cao-lon-the-nao-ar741401.html