April 21, 1954: Creative fighting style of Regiment 36, Division 308

After the second attack, the General Military Commission reported the results of the battle and preparations to the Politburo. After the Politburo agreed with the results and preparation plan of the General Military Commission, it sent a letter to General Vo Nguyen Giap. The content is as follows:

“To: Comrade Vo Nguyen Giap

On April 19, 1954, the Politburo met to listen to comrade Hoang Tung report on the second attack and the current combat preparation plan. The Politburo agreed with his assessment of the results of our army's two recent attacks and the current preparation plan. The Politburo reminded him to pay attention to a few points: Because the enemy also clearly recognized the importance of this battle, especially the American interventionists who were trying their best to push it, they continued to try to cope. They could:

- Learn from the experience of defending hill A1 and organize defense in the central area;

- Concentrate more planes and heavy artillery to destroy our positions;

- Try to destroy our supply lines in a targeted manner.

Their aim was to hold out until the rainy season, assuming that at that time our army would have to withdraw because they could not overcome the difficulties in supply.

And if they can concentrate enough planes and paratroopers, when necessary, they can parachute behind our positions or at a point that can be held on our supply line to save them.

Our immediate task is to, on the one hand, strengthen the army's determination to win total victory, especially that of cadres at all levels, firmly grasp the motto "fight firmly, advance firmly"; on the other hand, ensure supplies for the front line.

The Politburo urged the Supply Council and the Zones and Provinces to mobilize human and material resources to serve the campaign. Comrade Tran was sent to the front, Comrade Dung to Zone 4, and Comrade Thanh to Viet Bac to inspect and urge. At home, Comrade Luong was in charge of general urging.

Comrade, remember to report daily to the Central Committee the results of transporting food and ammunition to the front line.

2. The Politburo also agreed with the plan to build the army according to the opinions of the comrades. Comrade Thanh and Comrade Dung were assigned to immediately carry out the necessary tasks, and at the same time, to study some related issues.

The Politburo has a brief resolution attached herewith for you to disseminate to all cadres and party members to clearly understand the determination of the Party Central Committee to strive to complete the task.

On behalf of the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Vietnam, TRUONG CHINH (*)

Fierce fighting is taking place at position 206. Photo: VNA

Our troops dug trenches close to the 206 stronghold, completed the offensive position, and completed combat preparations. The 312th and 308th Divisions continued to dig the last meters of trenches, completely cutting off the enemy airport.

At 9:00 a.m. on April 21, enemy artillery from Muong Thanh, Hill 204, mortars from Hill 206 and all kinds of infantry fire from the horizontal trench axis, which was in direct contact with us, fired fiercely at the defensive position of Battalion 16, concentrated on line 1 and the last section near the Nam Rom River. We lost 1, 2 comrades were wounded, the front trench was destroyed.

After 40 minutes of shelling, about a platoon of European-African soldiers from the center advanced along the road to attack our defensive lines. On the first line, Platoon Leader Dung waited for the enemy to approach before ordering the entire platoon to open fire simultaneously. They were attacked by surprise, some died, the rest fled towards the center. Artillery and mortars from the regiment and division fired at the airport and the area where the enemy was concentrated at the crossroads, destroying some of the enemy. Once again, the enemy's attack was defeated. The battalion commander ordered the units to increase observation, promptly detect enemy actions, quickly repair collapsed trenches, and be ready to attack the enemy in all directions.

On the morning of April 21, the enemy launched the 6th Airborne Battalion to attack the 88th Regiment's position. The fighting was fierce from morning to evening. Three times the enemy captured our forward positions, and three times they were repelled by soldiers of the 23rd Battalion, 36th Regiment, and 308th Division, under the command of comrade Nguyen Quoc Tri.

Learning from the experience of the battle at stronghold 106 (night of April 1), Regiment 36 decided to destroy stronghold 206 by secretly digging trenches, going through layers of enemy barbed wire fences, digging trenches and building positions for firepower and impulses, and at the same time actively using firepower to destroy enemy gun emplacements and bunkers on the outside. This creative fighting method was called the encirclement tactic by the Regiment. The Regiment organized a line of fire including bazookas, 82mm mortars and a number of snipers to suppress the enemy in the fort, creating conditions for our troops to dig encirclement trenches.

On the night of April 21, the 308th Division Command sent the 70th Battalion to reinforce the 88th Regiment, while organizing firepower ready to support the 88th Regiment to fight the enemy's counterattack and dig trenches to cut off the airport. Division Commander Vuong Thua Vu went to the trenches to inspect, urge, and direct the troops to build the battlefield and arrange for combat.

On the combined battlefields:

Toan Thang guerrillas (Tien Lang) intercepted three enemy companies coming to break the siege of My Loc outpost, killing 39 enemies, shaking the enemy outpost system along the Da Do River. Also in April, the main force of the Inter-zone and local troops of Kien An raided the Dong Ta outpost (Vinh Bao district capital), killing 200 enemies, breaking the siege of Tay Am.

Enemy side :

In Dien Bien Phu, the enemy's stronghold was only connected to the outside by a one-way air bridge because it could no longer evacuate wounded soldiers. The enemy was having great difficulty in protecting the main traffic routes, especially the Hai Phong-Hanoi road and railway (the enemy's airports and warehouses).

The situation of the soldiers was deteriorating, especially the allied army (there were many deserters, asking to join our side). The fall of Dien Bien Phu would only have very serious consequences as far as France and Vietnam (puppet). The French predicted that the war would end in early or mid-summer, depending on the conclusion of the Geneva Conference.