On April 27, 1954, the enemy's Operation Condor was defeated.

The Dien Bien Phu Campaign: On April 27, 1954, our troops pursued the enemy all the way back to Muong Sai and Luang Prabang. The enemy's Operation Condor was a complete failure.

On the enemy side : In April alone, 3,071 enemy troops were eliminated from combat at Dien Bien Phu. Paratrooper reinforcements that month included two battalions and 650 soldiers. However, these reinforcements could not compensate for the heavy losses suffered. Regarding weapons, only one of the ten tanks remained operational, only one of the four 155mm cannons was still firing, and only 14 of the 24 105mm cannons remained functional. The French Indochina Expeditionary Force command attempted to save itself by launching Operation Condor to relieve the siege of the Dien Bien Phu stronghold on April 27, 1954.

Our troops divided into several columns, penetrating deep to destroy enemy strongholds at Dien Bien Phu. (Archival photo)

On April 27, 1954, British Prime Minister Churchill declared in the House of Commons: "The British Royal Government is not prepared to make any promises of military action in Indochina until the outcome of the Geneva Conference is known." The declaration was met with enthusiastic applause from the House of Commons.

On the same day, French Ambassador Massigli requested a meeting with Prime Minister Churchill, continuing to plead with Britain to consider the fate of the troops stationed at Dien Bien Phu. Churchill told the French Ambassador: "I have suffered in Singapore, Hong Kong, and Tobruk. The British cannot, because the fate of a French army has already been sealed, miss the opportunity to resolve their important issues with the communist powers in Geneva."

On our side : On April 27, 1954, upon receiving news that enemy troops from Laos were coming to relieve Dien Bien Phu, the Front Command decided to use the 148th Regiment and a reconnaissance company in Nam Hong Cum to advance towards Muong Khoa to intercept the enemy. We ambushed them near Muong Khoa, located southwest of Dien Bien Phu, destroying four companies of Laotian puppet troops. The enemy fled, and our troops pursued them all the way to Muong Sai and Luang Prabang (Laos). The enemy's Operation Condor was a complete failure.

On the same day, the Front Party Committee convened a meeting of the Party Secretaries of the divisions to criticize the "right-wing negative" phenomena. In previous campaigns, each unit only fought a few battles, and those battles usually lasted no more than one night. After each battle, our troops immediately withdrew to safe positions behind the lines to rest and consolidate, preparing for the next battle. This campaign, however, had dragged on for many months. Long-distance pursuits, assaults on enemy positions, defensive operations, and fierce counterattacks took place continuously. Immediately afterward, they began building fortifications, a task in itself that was also a form of fighting. Our troops ate and slept right in the fortifications on the battlefield, facing the enemy. The intensity of the fighting exceeded human endurance.

The Campaign Command, under the direct leadership of General Vo Nguyen Giap, is discussing battle plans for each battle. (Photo: VNA)

The political officers, while assessing the ideological situation in the units, observed that the recent fighting highlighted examples of bravery, resourcefulness, and creativity, but also revealed some negative manifestations, such as reluctance to make sacrifices or endure hardships, lax adherence to orders, and in some cases, officers abandoning their duties in the middle of a battle.

The Front Party Committee recognized that these new phenomena could not be ignored and decided to convene a conference of division secretaries and comrades in charge of general departments... to conduct a review of negative right-wing ideology before entering the decisive battle.

The commander introduced the new Politburo resolution to the conference and presented the Front Party Committee's report: "Resolutely combat negative right-wing ideology, build a positive revolutionary spirit, and thoroughly obey orders to ensure complete victory for the campaign."

The conference discussed and agreed on the situation after carefully analyzing the difficulties and advantages for both sides. Everyone rigorously reviewed their shortcomings. With the Geneva Conference approaching, everyone felt they were facing enormous tasks, not only to win the final sprint but also to reach the finish line on time. There was no room for distraction from the responsibility of achieving victory with the fewest casualties.

The following day, most of the political officers dispersed to assist units in implementing a rapid education program for all troops, from Party committee members to Party members, from officers to soldiers, to ensure everyone understood the situation and strengthened their resolve to complete their mission. A new spirit arose everywhere. This was a great success in political work on the Dien Bien Phu front, one of the greatest successes of political work in the history of our Army's combat.

THANH VINH/qdnd.vn

Source: https://baothanhhoa.vn/chien-dich-dien-bien-phu-ngay-27-4-1954-cuoc-hanh-binh-condor-cua-dich-bi-that-bai-212776.htm