The big question is, what will our army do to win on the main front of Dien Bien Phu? The total French army has 12,000 men, 2 battalions of 105mm artillery, many battalions of howitzers, tanks, nearly 20 reconnaissance, bomber, and transport planes... They are ready to send troops from the plains to reinforce Dien Bien Phu by air at any time.
General on bail
Once, General Vo Nguyen Giap came to see and report to Uncle Ho about the situation of the French army pouring into the Northwest and some other battlefields. The General recounted: “…. Uncle Ho’s eyes suddenly showed a focused look. His hand placed on the table suddenly raised and clenched. He said: “The enemy is concentrating mobile troops to create strength. Don’t be afraid. If we force them to disperse their troops, that strength will no longer exist.” Uncle Ho’s hand opened, each finger pointing in a different direction.”
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| General Vo Nguyen Giap (standing) discussed the attack on Dien Bien Phu. |
This is considered the military ideology that Uncle Ho conveyed to General Vo Nguyen Giap, the art of war is not to attack the enemy's strong points. Focus on attacking the weak points, holding the enemy in distant places, using diversions, luring the enemy to "dangerous" places to attack with all their might, leaving the enemy with no way to retreat.
The Dien Bien Phu stronghold complex, in terms of military terrain, had no way to retreat when under strong attack. At the end of December 1953, the Politburo decided to choose Dien Bien Phu as the strategic decisive battle point in the Winter-Spring of 1953-1954. The campaign Party Committee was appointed to include: General Vo Nguyen Giap, Party Secretary, Campaign Commander, Comrade Hoang Van Thai, Chief of the General Staff, Comrade Le Liem, Director of the General Political Department, Comrade Dang Kim Giang, Director of Supply, etc.
The campaign command mobilized our main force corps to march to the Northwest. The commander of the 105-mile howitzer and anti-aircraft artillery units, considered the "trump cards" of the campaign, General Vo Nguyen Giap met them directly and assigned the task: "The heavy artillery going into battle for the first time will face many great difficulties. In the immediate future, we must ensure safety and absolute secrecy during the march. If we can bring people, vehicles, and artillery to their destination safely, we will achieve 60% of victory."
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| Our troops pulled artillery into the Dien Bien Phu battlefield. Photo: Document |
On January 1, 1954, General Nava sent a report to Paris, France, full of anxiety: "... Everyone feels that the enemy is determined to use force to attack Dien Bien Phu with very large means... In case of attack, what are our chances of victory? Just two weeks ago, I assessed it as 100% victory. But with the appearance of new means... I cannot guarantee victory. In any case, Dien Bien Phu will play the role of a poisonous boil and will allow us to avoid a general battle in the plains."
When planning to build the Dien Bien Phu stronghold, Nava did not think that the small Viet Minh could not bring heavy artillery up to the high hills surrounding the Dien Bien Phu basin. French bombers continuously attacked fiercely to cut off all supply routes from the rear to the Northwest.
Before leaving for the campaign, General Vo Nguyen Giap came to greet Uncle Ho. Uncle Ho asked:
- You're going so far, is there any difficulty in directing the battlefields?
- The Deputy Chief of the General Staff and Deputy Director of the General Political Department are all present there. The General Command will organize a forward headquarters to command the national battlefield, including volunteer troops in Laos and Cambodia. Mr. Nguyen Chi Thanh and Mr. Van Tien Dung will stay at the base area, in charge of the Northern Delta front. The only obstacle is that it is far away, when there are important and urgent issues, it is difficult to ask for the opinion of Uncle Ho and the Politburo.
- The Commander-in-Chief is at the front, the General is at home. I give you full authority. If there are any difficulties, discuss and reach a consensus within the Party Committee, agree with the advisor, then decide, and report back later.
When saying goodbye, Uncle Ho reminded the General: "This battle is very important, we must fight to win. Only fight if we are sure of victory, and not if we are not sure of victory."
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| Map of the Bien Bien Phu campaign. Photo: Le Giang |
Ensure the principle of "sure win"
On January 5, 1954, General Vo Nguyen Giap and a part of the campaign command set off for the Northwest. At first, our army's battle plan for the Dien Bien Phu campaign was "fight fast, win fast". Because the enemy had just landed in Dien Bien Phu and had not yet built solid fortifications, our army's "fight fast, win fast" was reasonable. Because the road to the Northwest mountains and forests was difficult and dangerous, the soldiers and laborers transporting weapons and food, especially pulling heavy artillery up the high mountains, were delayed compared to the expected time. The French army had enough time to build many solid defense resistance centers.
Our artillery units have moved their artillery to combat positions, waiting for orders to open fire and rain fire on Muong Thanh airport and many other locations in Dien Bien Phu. General Vo Nguyen Giap has carefully studied the situation on the battlefield and raised three major issues: First, our main force has so far only destroyed at most a reinforced enemy battalion with solid fortifications in the battle of Nghia Lo and Na San. We have only attacked the positions of battalions and below battalions with field fortifications located in the stronghold, and there are still some unsuccessful battles with many casualties.
Second, in this battle we had no planes or tanks, but we fought a large-scale joint battle with infantry and artillery for the first time, and without any rehearsals. Recently, a regimental commander asked to return the artillery because he did not know how to coordinate.
Third, our troops have only ever been used to fighting at night, in terrain that is easy to hide in. Our main force has no experience in attacking during the day on flat terrain, against an enemy with superiority in aircraft, artillery, tanks... The battle will take place on a field 15km long and 6-7km wide...
The date and time for the opening shots of the Dien Bien Phu campaign were set, and the entire Vietnamese people put all their efforts into this decisive battle. However, the campaign command and General Vo Nguyen Giap still did not grasp the highest principle of Uncle Ho's advice: "This battle is very important, we must fight to win. Only fight if we are sure of victory, and not sure of victory."
To ensure the highest principle of “fighting with certainty to win”, General Vo Nguyen Giap convened a meeting of the Party Committee and the Campaign Command, changing the motto of destroying the enemy from “fighting quickly, winning quickly” to “fighting firmly, advancing firmly”. He ordered the troops on the entire front to retreat to the assembly point.
The General sent an urgent telegram to the artillery unit: “The enemy situation has changed. The determination to destroy Tran Dinh (code name of Dien Bien Phu in the campaign) remains firm. Now the way of fighting has changed. Therefore, I order you comrades from 5pm today to pull the artillery out of the battlefield, retreat to the assembly point, and prepare again. Strictly comply with the order. No explanation.”
Pulling the artillery into the battlefield was hard work, but pulling it out was much more difficult, because our army mainly used human power. All cadres, soldiers, and laborers on the entire front thoroughly followed the order to "fight firmly, advance firmly". After a period of time, our army reorganized, consolidated its forces, and gathered logistics from the rear to transport them up. The campaign command deployed a new mission, the "trump card" artillery was brought back up to the high mountains, and fortifications were dug for the artillery to hide in.
LIJIANG
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