The distinctive features of Vietnamese military art.

Our troops launched an offensive to liberate Buon Ma Thuot, marking the beginning of the Central Highlands Campaign. Photo: VNA.

The General Offensive and Uprising that completely liberated South Vietnam and unified the country left behind many distinctive features of Vietnamese military art, manifested in the following main aspects: The art of creating a force advantage, forming overwhelming power to ensure defeating the enemy from a position of strength.

During the Spring Offensive and Uprising of 1975, based on our conditions, the enemy situation, terrain, and weather; inheriting the traditions and experiences of the nation in the history of fighting foreign invaders to liberate the country and protect the Fatherland, to ensure victory, our Party directed the concentration of forces in a rational manner to defeat the enemy.

Overall, the Central Highlands Campaign saw our forces and the enemy's forces being roughly equal (58 infantry/42 infantry). We lacked an air force, but on the main objective of Buon Ma Thuot, we concentrated 4.5 times more infantry (18 infantry/4 infantry), 3.5 times more tanks and armored vehicles (64/18), and more than 4 times more artillery (78 guns/18 guns). This created the strength to continue our victories in the battle against the enemy's counterattack and retreat along Highway 7.

In the Tri Thien - Hue Campaign and the Da Nang Campaign , comparing forces, we only had an advantage over the enemy in main units (1.2/1); local forces (we 1/enemy 1.5), artillery (we 1/enemy 2.4), tanks and armored vehicles were superior to ours (we 1/enemy 4).

In the Ho Chi Minh Campaign , we identified Saigon as the "capital," the location of the headquarters of the Saigon puppet government and army; they would concentrate their forces to stubbornly resist fiercely, despite the extreme demoralization and wavering of their officers and soldiers. Therefore, we concentrated a powerful force, overwhelming the enemy like never before, 1.7 times larger, with three times the number of units concentrated.

Through the art of strategically creating superior forces, science has formed mobile main army units with very strong offensive capabilities, high speed of attack, superior advantage in fighting the enemy, and completing campaign missions in the shortest possible time.

The art of combining offensive and insurgent tactics, coordinating the operations of the three branches of the armed forces, with the large-scale strike of the main army as the central coordinating force.

A distinctive feature of military art in the Spring Offensive and Uprising of 1975 was the combination of the lightning-fast attacks of mobile main army units with the uprising of the masses; combining the destruction of the enemy with the seizure of control, creating overwhelming power. In this, the military offensive of the main army units preceded the enemy's military forces, directly aiming to destroy the enemy's military strength, determining the final victory of the war, and directly supporting the mass uprising. The mass uprising served to stretch and disperse the enemy, win over the population and territory, open up new offensive positions, create new advantages, and further strengthen our armed forces, giving them the conditions and opportunities to advance and achieve great victories. This combination was the inevitable consequence of the development and integration of two forms of struggle: political and military; two methods of warfare: guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare.

The art of leadership involves applying flexible and creative tactics to successfully accomplish campaign objectives.

During the major campaigns of the Spring Offensive and Uprising of 1975, the Central Military Commission and the General Staff directed the flexible, creative, and successful application of various tactical forms such as controlling the enemy, deceiving the enemy, luring the enemy into our traps; attacking the enemy both inside and outside fortifications, in mountainous, rural, plain, and urban areas; attacking the enemy in concentrated positions or in retreat; attacking the enemy when they are prepared or when preparations are made hastily; attacking the enemy when they are organizing their defenses from afar and attacking the enemy on islands; attacking enemy divisions deployed on the outer perimeter, and launching deep penetration attacks using mechanized units into enemy nerve centers in towns and cities. Particularly noteworthy is the success of combined arms operations against cities, towns, and large military bases, employing various tactics such as: attacking enemy bases, towns, and large cities; offensive maneuvers; mobile offensives; engaging enemy airborne landings; and pursuing the enemy, both with and without preparation time. These tactics have developed remarkably and achieved high combat effectiveness. Large-scale combined arms attacks were widely applied in the offensives against Buon Ma Thuot town and the cities of Hue, Da Nang, and Saigon, affirming the tactical prowess of our troops reaching the pinnacle of art in the Vietnamese revolutionary war.

The art of amplifying the victory of a key battle before with the victory of the next key battle.

During the Spring Offensive of 1975, the major offensive campaigns had different characteristics, but they all shared a common feature: the decisive victory in the preceding battle created the opportunity and conditions for the subsequent decisive battle. The subsequent decisive battle then capitalized on the achievements of the preceding one to achieve an even greater victory.

In the Central Highlands Campaign , the crucial opening battle, the successful attack on Buon Ma Thuot town, forced the puppet 23rd Infantry Division to counterattack precisely where we had anticipated, leading to our second crucial battle. This forced the enemy into the mistake of withdrawing from the Central Highlands, creating the opportunity for our third crucial battle (attacking the retreating enemy on Highway 7), liberating the Central Highlands. The victory in the Central Highlands Campaign created momentum for development and the liberation of the South Central provinces.

In the Tri Thien-Hue Campaign and the Da Nang Campaign , the great victory in Tri Thien-Hue annihilated, captured, and dispersed the entire enemy force north of Hai Van Pass. This major victory prevented the enemy in Hue from regrouping in Da Nang and terrified them in Da Nang. Along with the victory in the South (liberating Quang Ngai and Tam Ky), this pivotal opening battle created the opportunity for us to decisively win the crucial battle in Da Nang. Although our forces there were outnumbered by the enemy, we held a significantly stronger position.

In the Ho Chi Minh Campaign , the key battles took place both consecutively and in parallel. The breakthrough battle that annihilated five enemy infantry divisions defending the outer perimeter, preventing them from regrouping in Saigon, can be considered the first key battle. This opened the way for the penetrating forces to seize five key targets within Saigon (the second key battle), liberating Saigon-Gia Dinh and bringing the resistance war against the US to complete victory.

Thus, the campaigns consistently affirmed the characteristic of winning the key battle first, creating crucial opportunities for launching the next key battle. However, the development of our military art here lies in promptly seizing the opportunity of victory, expanding the gains of the previous key battle to win the next key battle, changing the course of the campaign and strategy, and in some cases, ending the entire war in victory.

The Spring Offensive and Uprising of 1975 was a decisive strategic battle, culminating in a complete victory in our nation's resistance war against the US. This glorious historical event marks the pinnacle of Vietnamese military art in the Ho Chi Minh era. It can be said that this was a model of strategic leadership by the Politburo, the Central Committee of the Party, and the Central Military Commission in the resistance war against the US. In the Spring Offensive and Uprising of 1975, we maximized the combined strength of the entire nation, inheriting the nation's military traditions while absorbing the best military practices from around the world.

The Spring Offensive and Uprising of 1975 also represented a high point in the development of Vietnam's people's war. The creative and unique developments in military art during the Spring Offensive and Uprising of 1975 contributed to further perfecting and enriching the treasury of revolutionary Vietnamese military art in the Ho Chi Minh era, leaving valuable lessons for the cause of building and defending the Fatherland in the new era – the era of the Vietnamese nation's resurgence.

(To be continued)

Source: https://hanoimoi.vn/ky-niem-50-nam-ngay-giai-phong-mien-nam-thong-nhat-dat-nuoc-30-4-1975-30-4-2025-nhung-dau-moc-lich-su-cua-dai-thang-mua-xuan-nam-1975-bai-7-dac-sac-nghe-thuat-quan-su-viet-nam-698125.html