General Vo Nguyen Giap

General Vo Nguyen Giap - the outstanding Commander-in-Chief, who was imbued with the direction of the Politburo and President Ho Chi Minh, and with his sharp thinking and the courage of a military leader, made an important decision, shifting from the motto "Fight fast, win fast" to "Fight steady, advance steady". The historic Dien Bien Phu campaign reached its final victory from this important turning point. The military strategy of General Vo Nguyen Giap has been known and admired by the whole world.

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During the long resistance war against French colonialism, General Vo Nguyen Giap directly commanded many major campaigns, of which Dien Bien Phu was the largest. The victory of the campaign had significance and magnitude far surpassing previous campaigns in many aspects, further affirming the outstanding strategic talent of the Commander-in-Chief.

At the end of December 1953, the Politburo was determined to destroy the enemy's stronghold in the Northwest. On January 1, 1954, the Politburo appointed a leadership agency to command the campaign. General Vo Nguyen Giap was appointed commander and Party Secretary of the Dien Bien Phu Front. The plan to mobilize reinforcements to the Northwest was implemented.

General Vo Nguyen Giap commented: “This will be the first time our troops launch a large-scale attack on a stronghold with ten thousand troops. Our officers and soldiers have been prepared to attack the stronghold... The upcoming battle will be an unprecedented challenge for us in the war. We have chosen the mountainous battlefield, which has many favorable conditions to destroy the enemy. But Dien Bien Phu is not entirely mountainous. Here is the largest field in the Northwest. Many strongholds are located on the field. Our troops will have to conduct many battles with mobile troops supported by aircraft, tanks, and artillery on flat terrain similar to the plains...” (1)

On January 5, 1954, General Vo Nguyen Giap and the forward command post of the General Command set out for the front. Before leaving for the battle, General Vo Nguyen Giap went to greet Uncle Ho at Khuoi Tat. Uncle Ho asked: “You are going so far away, is there any difficulty in commanding the battlefields?” (2) The General replied: “… The only difficulty is that it is far away, when there are important and urgent issues, it is difficult to ask for the opinion of Uncle Ho and the Politburo” (3). Uncle Ho encouraged: “The Commander-in-Chief is going to the front, the “general is abroad”! I give you full authority to make decisions. This battle is very important, we must fight to win! Only fight if we are sure of victory, and only fight if we are not sure of victory” (4). The campaign commander “felt that this responsibility was very heavy” (5).

Changing the battle plan - The most difficult decision in a commander's life

Focus - 70 years of Dien Bien Phu Victory: Military genius - General Vo Nguyen Giap (Photo 2). — Our anti-aircraft artillery force fought bravely and made outstanding achievements, not only protecting the sky and supporting the infantry in combat, but also contributing to stopping the air support for the French army at Dien Bien Phu. Photo: VNA file

During the Dien Bien Phu campaign and perhaps throughout General Vo Nguyen Giap's military career, the decision to change the combat strategy from "fight fast, win fast" to "fight steadily, advance steadily" was considered the most difficult decision - as he himself admitted. That decision demonstrated the sharp military thinking and bravery of the commander; but at the same time, it was also a manifestation of the imbuement of Ho Chi Minh's military ideology on "fight surely, win"; it demonstrated the humanity of a general who "puts work first", always knew how to promote the role of the collective, and highly respected the opinions of the collective for the common good.

On January 12, 1954, General Vo Nguyen Giap and a number of cadres arrived at the front command post. At this time, our side and the advisors agreed to use a quick attack to destroy the enemy, because "a quick attack will win quickly, the troops are still in good shape, will reduce losses and will not have to deal with great difficulties in ammunition and food for tens of thousands of soldiers and laborers in a long battle" (6). The scheduled time to open fire was January 20, 1954.

After hearing the situation report, the commander “felt that this plan was not right and wanted to hear more about the situation”, because “the troops still had to spend some time building the road. The enemy still had the conditions to increase their troops. Right now, fighting quickly and winning quickly was difficult. Later on, it would be even more difficult” (7). However, he still kindly instructed everything so that the cadres knew how to overcome the difficulties and complete the tasks according to the disseminated plan. He also determined that he needed to continue thinking to grasp the actual situation more firmly and find more factors that could lead to victory by fighting quickly or not.

The General was troubled not only by President Ho Chi Minh's words "this campaign is very important, we must win, if we are not sure of victory, we will not fight", but also by his responsibility for the blood of the soldiers. "We cannot lose this battle. Most of the elite of the main force during the eight years of resistance are concentrated here. The capital is extremely valuable, but also very little. From the beginning of the large campaign in 1950 until this spring, it is still the same units, the same people. I have belonged to each regiment, each battalion, each main company, and know the company, platoon and soldier cadres who have made outstanding achievements. It is clear that everyone who set out this time is ready to sacrifice to win. But the mission of the campaign is not only to win, but also to preserve the valuable capital for the long-term war..." (8). If the campaign is not successful and the main force suffers heavy casualties, what will happen to the future of the resistance and what will happen to the position of our diplomatic corps in Geneva?

After that, the commander had many sleepless nights, pondering and considering many times, but "still found very few factors of victory": "I instructed the envoys to go and grasp the situation, and to report promptly anything noteworthy. Everyone reflected the very high spirit of combat preparation of the officers and soldiers. The 312th Regiment Commander Le Trong Tan told me that during the battle, they would have to break through three times in a row to reach the center. But this was only a calculation of the work that had to be done. The 308th Regiment Commander Vuong Thua Vu, in charge of the deep thrust, remained completely silent. On the ninth day, two days before the opening fire, comrade Pham Kiet, Deputy Director of the Security Department, who was monitoring the artillery pulling in the West, asked to meet me by phone. Kiet commented: "Our artillery is all placed on the field, the terrain is very open, if it is counter-fired or attacked by aircraft, it will be difficult to avoid losses. Some artillery has not yet been pulled to the battlefield” (9).

After postponing the opening of the campaign to January 25, 1954, then postponing it another day to January 26 due to difficulties in moving the artillery in, not ensuring health..., on the morning of January 26, General - Commander-in-Chief Vo Nguyen Giap - made his historic decision: to temporarily postpone the attack, pull the artillery out, withdraw troops to the assembly position, and prepare again according to the motto "Fight firmly, advance firmly". After several hours of discussion, with a spirit of solidarity and a high sense of responsibility, the Party Committee finally agreed with this change and unanimously agreed that changing the combat motto was a great determination, a concrete demonstration of the Central Committee's thorough understanding of the guiding ideology "fight firmly to win".

It can be seen that what happened at the Dien Bien Phu Campaign Command in the past shows that the two factors that made General Vo Nguyen Giap successful in bringing the collective to a consensus on how to fight the campaign were first of all political responsibility before the Party and the people, before the blood and bones of the soldiers; along with that was a style that was close to reality, using reality to convince the collective to accept the highest requirement, which was to ensure "sure victory".

The change in the combat strategy from “Fight fast, win fast” to “Fight steady, advance steady” is considered the most dramatic event in the history of the resistance war against French colonialism, which General Vo Nguyen Giap called “the most difficult decision in his command career”. And the historic Dien Bien Phu campaign reached its final victory from this important turning point.

“Play Sure” and Win

Implementing the plan of "fighting firmly, advancing firmly", with a force of over 260,000 laborers, using all kinds of means of transport and a determination higher than the mountains, we overcame difficulties that seemed insurmountable, ensuring sufficient supply of weapons, ammunition, food, and medicine for 50,000 soldiers and tens of thousands of laborers at the front, opening dozens of kilometers of roads to bring artillery to the battlefield.

Entering the battle, with three attacks, our troops destroyed the Dien Bien Phu stronghold; killed, wounded and captured all 16,000 enemy troops stationed there, defeated the highest form of defense of the French colonialists, destroyed the enemy's will to continue the war, forced France to sit at the negotiating table and sign the Geneva Agreement on July 21, 1954, ending the war and restoring peace in Indochina.

After more than 100 days at the Dien Bien Phu front, together with the entire army, he established a resounding victory that shook the world, Commander-in-Chief Vo Nguyen Giap not only excellently completed his mission before the entire Party, the entire people and the entire army, but also left for future generations of cadres and soldiers profound lessons on military thinking, offensive will and general style, including skillful, resolute and accurate handling of the relationship between the head of the campaign and the collective leadership of the front to choose the most effective way of fighting for the Dien Bien Phu Campaign.