What do Ukraine and NATO need from each other?

Advanced weapons, along with clear requirements for membership, are what Kyiv wants a definitive answer to from the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).

Ukrainian President Zelensky and NATO leaders at the summit held in Vilnius, Lithuania, in July 2023. At the conclusion of the summit, Ukraine did not receive an invitation to join the alliance. (Source: Anadolu Agency)

Without new military support from the U.S., Ukraine's ground forces will be unable to hold their ground against the might of the Russian military. In this context, the U.S. House of Representatives must vote as soon as possible to pass the emergency spending package that the Senate overwhelmingly approved last February. The most urgent priority is to provide funding for the supply of artillery shells, anti-aircraft missiles, attack missiles, and other critical military supplies to Kyiv.

What does Ukraine need from NATO?

But even if Ukraine receives this much-needed support from its allies, the fundamental question remains: How can Ukraine secure its own future? That is the question NATO leaders need to answer when they meet in Washington this July for the summit commemorating the alliance's 75th anniversary.

For NATO, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine is not simply about territory. It also concerns Ukraine's political future. The vast majority of Ukrainians want their country to be a member of NATO and the European Union (EU).

Since 2023, the EU has been holding accession talks with Ukraine. However, this process will take many years to complete. Meanwhile, Ukraine is seeking an invitation to join NATO as soon as possible. Yet, NATO countries appear divided on when Kyiv should join.

Some members, led by the Baltic states, Poland, and France, want the alliance to extend a formal invitation at the Washington summit in July of this year. They believe that the prolonged security vacuums in Europe give Russia an opportunity to fill those gray areas, as it has done with Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova.

Meanwhile, other members, including the US and Germany, are not as prepared to move so quickly toward admitting Ukraine into NATO. Outgoing Dutch Prime Minister Mark Rutte, who could become the next NATO Secretary General, summarized this view at the Munich Security Conference last February by saying: “As long as the conflict continues, Ukraine cannot become a NATO member.”

Former officials have also proposed various ideas to narrow this gap in opinion. One is to extend an invitation to Ukraine but not implement it until an unspecified time. This would be a symbolic gesture, as no provisions of the Treaty apply until all 32 members ratify Ukraine's accession. Another idea is to invite Ukraine to begin accession negotiations, borrowing a model from the EU's enlargement process. However, EU candidates prefer to follow the familiar path, applying and enforcing EU law for many years.

A similar process at NATO is the Membership Action Plan (MAP), but at the Vilnius summit in 2023, NATO members agreed that Kyiv had already met “more than enough” requirements for this process. Unless the goals and timeline of the negotiations are clearly defined, inviting Ukraine to begin talks would put it in the “pawning” position it has been in since 2008, when NATO approved Ukraine's “potential” membership in the alliance.

The summit in Washington next July could provide an opportunity to bridge this gap and build consensus within the coalition on Ukraine. The first step is to clarify the reforms Ukraine needs to complete and the conditions it must meet before it can join the coalition.

Secondly, NATO needs to take charge of coordinating military support provided by the alliance of over 50 countries, helping Ukraine build a modern, coordinated military. Finally, NATO leaders need to strengthen Ukraine's defense capabilities by providing advanced weapons, such as long-range missiles, which some NATO members are unwilling to supply.

Ukraine's NATO future

At the Vilnius Summit in Lithuania in July 2023, instead of agreeing to extend the invitation that Ukraine desired, NATO leaders delayed addressing the issue, promising that “Ukraine’s future lies in NATO,” while noting that they would only extend the invitation “when the allies agree and the conditions are met.”

Although Ukraine may not be invited to the Alliance summit in Washington, the idea from the Vilnius Conference suggests a way forward: NATO must clarify what conditions Ukraine must meet, and then invite Kyiv to participate in direct negotiations at the NATO-Ukraine Council on when and how to implement those conditions.

To reach a consensus among allies, NATO leaders will have to agree on two conditions before officially inviting Ukraine to join the alliance. First, Ukraine must complete the democratic, anti-corruption, and security reforms outlined in Ukraine's annual national program – the formal framework preparing Kyiv for NATO membership.

At the Washington summit, NATO leaders may commit to helping Kyiv complete these reforms within a year. Secondly, the conflict in Ukraine must end. As long as military conflict continues in Ukraine, its membership in the alliance could lead to a direct confrontation between NATO and Russia – a gamble most NATO members are unwilling to take.

Before the second condition can be met, NATO must determine what constitutes a satisfactory end to the Russia-Ukraine war. This war cannot be considered over simply because it requires a peace agreement – ​​something very difficult to achieve in the short term. The popular belief that all wars end through negotiations is a misconception.

Most conflicts end with both sides exhausted or one side victorious, with virtually no wars ending through peaceful negotiations. In the future, the best possible outcome is for the conflict to enter a "freeze" – hostilities cease until a mutually satisfactory political solution is reached.

At the upcoming Washington summit, NATO leaders may agree to invite Ukraine to join once the conflict in Ukraine has ended satisfactorily: either Ukraine wins, which is highly unlikely, or through a lasting ceasefire or truce. After Ukraine joins NATO, the alliance's commitment to collective defense under Article 5 would only apply to territories under Kyiv's control. This condition is difficult for Kyiv to accept, as they fear a prolonged division of the country. However, the prospect of a frozen conflict might lead Kyiv to consolidate its controlled territory and secure NATO membership. Alliance leaders may need to clarify that if fighting resumes due to Ukrainian military actions, Article 5 will not apply.

Historically, there have been instances of extending security guarantees to a nation for disputed borders. The Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security between the United States and Japan, signed in 1960, committed the U.S. to defending only “territories under Japanese control,” excluding the northern territories occupied by the Soviet Union after World War II. Similarly, when the Federal Republic of Germany joined NATO in 1955, Article 5 applied only to West Germany, while East Germany, including the democratic West Berlin, was excluded until German reunification in 1990. Before being granted membership, West Germany had to agree “never to use force to achieve the goal of German reunification or to modify the existing borders of the Federal Republic of Germany.”

It's understandable that at the 2023 NATO summit in Vilnius, Ukrainian officials were concerned that the conditions were a “code” for non-fixed goals. As long as NATO doesn't define the conditions, it can always create further obstacles for Ukraine to overcome. Ukraine deserves clear answers, and NATO needs to define the terminology for its own internal unity and cohesion. At this year's summit, all 32 members will have to agree around a common understanding of Ukraine's path to NATO membership.

The President of Ukraine at the NATO Summit in Lithuania, July 2023. (Source: Sputnik)

Prerequisites for Kyiv

Perhaps the requirement to end the armed conflict as a prerequisite for Ukraine's accession to NATO will be one of the reasons Moscow prolongs the conflict. As long as Russia's special operations continue, NATO will not accept Ukraine as a new member. That is why Kyiv and its allies must demonstrate their resolve. They must convince Moscow that Russia is waging an unwinnable war. And to do that, NATO leaders need to agree on three additional measures, all aimed at strengthening Ukraine's defense capabilities and helping it build a modern army.

First, NATO must replace the U.S. as the leader of the Ukraine Defense Coalition (UDCG) – an alliance of about 50 nations that meets regularly to discuss Ukraine's military needs and decide which countries will provide the necessary equipment. Expanding NATO's role would institutionalize the alliance's support for Ukraine, ensuring continuity as U.S. commitment to Ukraine is under scrutiny.

Secondly, NATO must cooperate with Ukraine to develop a long-term vision for its military. Currently, many alliances are focusing on different elements: mine clearance, F-16 capabilities, information technology infrastructure, armored vehicles and artillery, as well as long-range strike capabilities. NATO can and should coordinate these efforts to help the Ukrainian military develop into a unified and fully capable interoperable force.

Third, NATO should establish a training mission for Ukraine, responsible for coordinating the training of Ukrainian forces from the United States, the United Kingdom, and other countries. Training is crucial for Ukrainian soldiers currently on the battlefield as well as for the future operational coordination capabilities of Ukrainian forces.

The aim of these three measures is not to reduce the participation of individual countries, but rather to enhance the effectiveness of current efforts to support Ukraine by bringing them under NATO's purview. Institutionalizing these functions within NATO would send a signal to Russian President Vladimir Putin that strong Western support for Ukraine would pose a challenge to Moscow.

The US and many Western countries have pledged to supply weapons to Ukraine. (Source: Reuters)

Would NATO be safer if it admitted Ukraine?

However, no long-term effort is meaningful if Ukraine fails in the ongoing conflict. That is why NATO must strengthen Ukraine's defenses and consider providing Kyiv with weapons that are not currently available, such as the US ATACMS missile and the German Taurus long-range missile.

When the conflict broke out, NATO members sought to balance support for Ukraine with the need to avoid direct confrontation with Russia. NATO countries restricted the types of weapons they would send and limited the ways in which Ukrainian forces were allowed to use them, such as pledging not to attack Russian territory.

The initial hesitation from the West was understandable. But some countries were too cautious for too long. Some NATO members, such as Germany and the US, expressed concerns about sending everything from tanks to F-16 fighter jets. But the situation has changed. Finally receiving approval from the US in 2023, Belgium, Denmark, the Netherlands, and Norway will soon send F-16s to Kyiv. The UK and France were among the first countries to send long-range missiles in 2023, enabling Ukraine to strike targets in Crimea…

There is a clear line between directly confronting Russian forces and providing Ukraine with the means to defend itself. Using NATO combat forces would be a mistake. But providing Ukraine with training, intelligence, surveillance, jamming, and military equipment is the right thing to do. NATO members have struggled to find the right balance between fear of escalation and belief in deterrence. While NATO should remain vigilant to avoid escalation, they can do more to ensure that Russia does not win.

Furthermore, NATO continues its eastward expansion, which is also one of the reasons Moscow launched its special operations in Ukraine to prevent this process. However, Moscow's actions actually increased, rather than decreased, the likelihood of Ukraine becoming a NATO member. And when Finland joined NATO in April 2023, with Moscow's special operations in Ukraine acting as a catalyst, NATO's land border with Russia more than doubled.

Sweden's accession in early March 2024 transformed the Baltic Sea into NATO's own "lake." And if Ukraine were to become a NATO member soon, the conflict between Russia and Ukraine could also be considered a reason to expedite Kyiv's accession, arguing that this would make Ukraine, as well as the whole of Europe, safer.

Source: https://baoquocte.vn/ukraine-va-nato-can-gi-o-nhau-269670.html