Why did it take Russia 8 months to liberate Kursk?

In August 2024, the Ukrainian military (AFU) launched a surprise attack on Russia's Kursk Oblast and occupied 1,300 square kilometers of Russian territory in a single attack. This incident happened so suddenly that it took Russian military leaders by surprise.

The Russian Armed Forces (RFAF) quickly mobilized its forces, called in reserves, and called in reinforcements from North Korea. Not to mention the air superiority of more than 4,000 Russian military aircraft, the Ukrainian aircraft did not dare to approach at all.

The heavy responsibility of commanding the battle was given to General Alexei Dyumin, special assistant to President Putin. The outside world calls him the "Prince of the Russian Army"; so his status and influence are obvious.

But surprisingly, after 8 months of hard fighting, the RFAF was able to retake Kursk, and also suffered many losses. After the AFU completely withdrew from Kursk (some information now says that there are still Ukrainian troops in the border forests between Kursk and Sumy), observers dissected why the RFAF got bogged down right on its own territory.

According to analysis, Russia's Kursk operation was stuck from the start; as soon as the AFU crossed the border, the RFAF responded quickly by sending in elite forces such as the 76th Airborne Division, the 810th Marine Brigade, and Chechen special forces. North Korea also sent more than 10,000 troops from the 11th Storm Division, along with 80 missile launchers, to support.

Russian planes circled overhead, and the Ukrainians had no chance to look up. But as the battle continued, the RFAF realized that things were not so simple. For seven months, the RFAF could only push the Ukrainians back step by step; at times the AFU even launched a major counterattack.

Outside observers are wondering, the RFAF has air superiority, elite forces and abundant reinforcements; so why is it so difficult? The answer is that after the AFU entered Kursk, the first thing they did was dig trenches and build fortifications. Their trenches were several meters deep, covered with earth and camouflage nets; thus, air strikes from Russian aircraft and artillery were ineffective.

The AFU built more solid concrete bunkers that could not be destroyed even by 1,500 kg bombs. The front line was also littered with mines and anti-tank ditches, and Russian tanks became live targets as soon as they crossed. This made it difficult for the RFAF to launch a massive attack.

In November 2024, the RFAF attempted to advance near Sudzha, the center of the AFU-controlled Kursk region. As soon as the T-90 tank group advanced, it was destroyed by AFU Javelin anti-tank missiles and mines. Dozens of tanks were destroyed and the counterattack was broken.

The AFU's defense system was not makeshift, but fully compliant with NATO standards and very well prepared. Although the RFAF had air superiority, they could not carpet bomb, leaving the infantry to attack.

Next are the 30,000 Ukrainian troops in Kursk, most of whom are trained and equipped to “NATO standards”. Their weapons include German Leopard 2 tanks, American M2 Bradley fighting vehicles, M777 howitzers and HIMARS rocket launchers; these weapons have caused a lot of damage to the Russian side, especially the HIMARS rocket launchers.

Another dangerous weapon of the Ukrainian army in Kursk was the FPV UAV; with a superior number compared to other fronts, the AFU FPV UAV specifically targeted Russian vehicles and troops for bombing. In February 2025, more than half of the North Korean commandos who died were killed by FPV UAVs.

The AFU in Kursk is also equipped with tactical electronic warfare equipment developed by Ukraine and the West; while the RFAF's communications and UAV systems are often jammed, causing command chaos. Although the RFAF has a large number of UAVs and is well equipped, it is really unable to counter this kind of high-tech tactics.

Another weakness of the RFAF at the Kursk front was the logistics of the operation. If the AFU supply center was located in Sumy, only a few dozen kilometers from the front line, it could provide supplies very quickly. On the other hand, the RFAF supply station was located in the city of Kursk. Not only was the distance long, but it was also frequently attacked by the AFU.

In January 2025, Ukrainian special forces broke into Kolenevo and destroyed a large Russian supply station, destroying an artillery ammunition depot. In addition, the AFU used civilian vehicles to transport supplies, and the Russians had little chance of stopping them.

The RFAF attempted to cut off the AFU's supply lines, but in the early stages, the AFU defended very well; it was only in the final stages of the campaign that the RFAF was able to control and turn the supply lines from Ukrainian territory into Kursk into "roads of death". At this point, the AFU's combat capabilities seriously declined.

The North Korean reinforcements did not help the RFAF much in the Kursk campaign. More than 10,000 North Korean troops arrived, the morale was high but the actual effectiveness was not very good. They had never seen a battlefield with UAVs flying all over the sky, leading to especially heavy casualties.

In addition to the language barrier and the lack of familiarity with Russian weapons, coordination was also very messy. In fact, the RFAF had 78,000 elite troops, but the AFU's defense and equipment at Kursk were too strong. Therefore, the small number of North Korean reinforcements could not reverse the situation.

However, under the constant pressure of the RFAF, the AFU gradually lost its fighting power. By early 2025, the tide had turned, as US military aid to Ukraine began to decline and the AFU in Kursk ran out of weapons, as the RFAF began to control the supply routes. When the RFAF saw an opportunity, they concentrated their firepower and launched a fierce attack.

In March 2025, the RFAF launched "Operation Thunder", in which armored and airborne divisions launched a coordinated all-out attack. The special forces secretly infiltrated behind the AFU defense lines, destroying all bridges and communication equipment. The AFU command collapsed directly.

The monastery in the village of Guevo was the last place where the AFU resisted; the Ukrainians relied on snipers and street fighting to stall for time, but the RFAF directly used demolition bombs and thermobaric artillery and blew up all the forts. When the AFU commanders saw that they could no longer hold out, they ordered a retreat. The RFAF gradually eliminated the remaining Ukrainian positions.

By April 2025, the entire Kursk region had been retaken, and Russia was celebrating. But the battle was brutal, with tens of thousands of casualties and a huge cost. Many wondered: Was the price of victory too high?

The eight-month battle of Kursk exposed many of the Russian military’s problems. Air superiority may sound impressive, but when faced with Ukrainian defenses and NATO weapons, it was not used.

If logistics always fail, no matter how strong the front line is, it is useless. The story of North Korea's military buildup also shows that problems cannot be solved by simply increasing the number of people. Modern warfare is a test of technology and coordination. (photo source Military Review, TASS, Sputnik).

Source: https://khoahocdoisong.vn/tai-sao-nga-mat-8-thang-de-giai-phong-kursk-post1543082.html