Dien Bien Phu Victory - Historical Milestone

Editor's note: 70 years ago, from March 13 to May 7, 1954, our army and people, under the leadership of the Party, headed by President Ho Chi Minh , carried out the decisive strategic battle of Dien Bien Phu, achieving a "world-shaking" victory, successfully ending the resistance war against the French colonialists, marking a great turning point in the history of our nation's struggle to build and defend the country. On the occasion of the 70th anniversary of this special event, the People's Army Newspaper opened the column "Dien Bien Phu Victory - Historical Milestone".

President Ho Chi Minh and comrades in the Central Party Standing Committee met to decide to launch the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring Campaign and the Dien Bien Phu Campaign.

President Ho Chi Minh directly assigned the task to General Vo Nguyen Giap and instructed: "This battle is extremely important, we must win if we fight, if we are not sure of winning, we will not fight."

Implementing the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring campaign plan, the Politburo Conference (meeting on December 6, 1953) approved the determination of the General Military Commission: "Concentrate the majority of the elite main force to launch an offensive campaign to destroy the Dien Bien Phu stronghold group". To carry out the above determination, after careful calculation, the Campaign Command decided to change the initial combat strategy from fighting quickly, solving quickly to fighting steadily, advancing steadily; the way of fighting focused on the advantage of artillery and firepower to fight each battle or a number of consecutive overlapping battles, destroying each stronghold and cluster of strongholds on the outskirts, "peel off" from the outside, opening the way to enter Muong Thanh field. With this way of fighting, the Campaign Command chose Him Lam as the opening target. The 312th Division (lacking the 165th Regiment) was reinforced with 2 75mm artillery companies, 2 120mm mortar companies... with the mission of attacking Him Lam, opening the Dien Bien Phu Campaign; during the fighting, it was directly supported by 2 105mm howitzer companies.

The General Command met to discuss the 1953-1954 Winter-Spring campaign plan.

Units were assigned to implement the Winter-Spring 1953-1954 combat plan.

At 5:00 p.m. on March 13, 1954, our artillery practiced effective preparatory firepower, creating conditions for the attacking forces of the 312th Division to move and occupy the starting position to charge. At 6:30 p.m., we began to open the door. Battalion 11, Regiment 141 attacked in the main direction, destroying Stronghold 1 (102); Battalion 428 attacked in the secondary direction, destroying Stronghold 2 (101A). Battalion 130, Regiment 209 attacked Stronghold 3 (101B). The fighting was fierce, especially in the main direction of Regiment 141. By 11:30 p.m., the enemy's Him Lam resistance center was completely destroyed, 270 were captured alive, and the 3rd Foreign Legion Battalion was eliminated from the battle.

Left photo: General Vo Nguyen Giap observes the battlefield for the last time before giving the order to open fire to start the Dien Bien Phu campaign. Right photo: At 5:05 p.m. on March 13, 1954, General Commander-in-Chief Vo Nguyen Giap gave the order to open fire to attack the Dien Bien Phu stronghold complex.

Initially, the Campaign Command determined the motto of "fighting fast, solving fast" with the method of concentrating the advantage of troops and firepower to break through mainly from the West to attack directly into the center of Muong Thanh, while simultaneously attacking from the East. With this motto and method of fighting, the opening target of the campaign could be one or several strongholds on the main attack direction from the West (311, 106) or secondary from the East (D1, C1, A1) into the Central Sub-sector. Because the enemy strengthened their defense, we encountered difficulties in preparation, especially in moving artillery into the battlefield, so the Campaign Command decided to switch to the motto of "fighting firmly, advancing firmly", the method of "peeling" from the outside in, destroying each resistance center to destroy the entire Dien Bien Phu stronghold. We determined to attack from the North and Northeast into the center of Muong Thanh and chose Him Lam and Doc Lap as the opening targets. At first, we planned to attack both Him Lam and Doc Lap hill in one night, then destroy the enemy in Ban Keo. After considering, especially the possibility of artillery support for the infantry attack, we decided to attack Him Lam first, then attack Doc Lap the following night to ensure victory.

Left photo: 21,000 bicycles, 261,500 porters, along with cars, ships, boats, donkeys, horses... day and night transported food, weapons, and ammunition to the Dien Bien Phu front. The great contribution of the porter force, ensuring logistics for the campaign, was one of the main reasons for the victory. Right photo: Our soldiers pulled dozens of tons of artillery over mountains and through forests to the Dien Bien Phu battlefield.

Troops marched to the Northwest to participate in the Dien Bien Phu Campaign in 1954.

Choosing Him Lam as the initial target also stemmed from the important role of this stronghold cluster. The Him Lam resistance center was the enemy's sudden defensive position on Route 41, the vital route leading into the Central Sector from the Northeast. This was a valuable terrain, including 5 high points at an altitude of 500m, controlling a large area around; along with the Nam Rom River in the North as a natural obstacle, favorable for defense. Determining that the Northeast was the main direction of attack for our troops, the enemy mobilized to the maximum to build Him Lam into the most solid stronghold cluster, the "steel door" protecting Muong Thanh. Together with Doc Lap, Ban Keo formed an outer defense system to block us from afar. Holding Him Lam against our attacks was the first manifestation proving the "inviolable" strength of the Dien Bien Phu stronghold cluster that both France and the US had spent a lot of effort to build. But if we lose Him Lam, Muong Thanh will be no different from a house with its door wide open, their defense system will have a large area broken on the outside. For us, Dien Bien Phu is the largest campaign to attack the enemy's defense in a solid fortification since the beginning of the resistance war against the French colonialists, with many forces participating, so the Him Lam stronghold cluster on Route 41 from Tuan Giao to Muong Thanh is a big obstacle. By destroying Him Lam, we can create a direct threat to the remaining targets of the Central Division (especially the enemy command post in Muong Thanh) at close range; separate the Northern Division and the Central Division, creating favorable conditions to destroy the stronghold clusters blocking the North; open the road from Tuan Giao to Muong Thanh to mobilize forces, deploy attack formations and transport large amounts of material to ensure the campaign along this route.

Photo 1: The captain of the main company of the 312th Division received the Quyết Thắng flag before attacking the Him Lam stronghold, opening the Dien Bien Phu Campaign, March 13, 1954. Photo: VNA

Photo 2: On the afternoon of March 13, 1954, dozens of our artillery pieces simultaneously fired at French positions on Him Lam hill, opening the Dien Bien Phu Campaign. By 11:30 p.m. the same day, the entire Him Lam Resistance Center, one of the strongest French strongholds located in the northeast of the stronghold group, was completely destroyed by us. Photo: VNA

Photo 3: Shock troops took advantage of the terrain and terrain to approach enemy positions on Him Lam hill and destroyed the enemy at this stronghold on March 13, 1954 - the opening day of the Dien Bien Phu Campaign. Photo: VNA

Choosing Him Lam as the opening target was the result of an accurate analysis and assessment of the fatal weaknesses of the Dien Bien Phu stronghold group in general and Him Lam in particular. Analyzing the enemy's defensive capabilities in Dien Bien Phu, the Campaign Command pointed out two "fatal" weaknesses of this "hedgehog": One is the rigidity and passivity of the defense system using the stronghold group. It is a tight structure of many strongholds, but in reality they are still separate strongholds. When attacked, each stronghold must mainly use its own forces to deal with it. This allows us to concentrate our strength to destroy each stronghold. Two is that Dien Bien Phu is isolated in the middle of the liberated mountainous area, far from the enemy's rear, and reinforcements and supplies must rely on the air. If we control or cut off the air route, this "hedgehog" will quickly lose its fighting power. Controlling Muong Thanh airport and cutting off the enemy's air supplies is a task within the campaign's capabilities. Him Lam was a strong base defended by Battalion 3 of the 13th Foreign Legion Brigade, consisting of 3 solid bases. At each base, bunkers and trenches were solidly built, surrounded by 4 to 6 rows of barbed wire fences interspersed with minefields from 100 to 200m wide. However, the Campaign Command still decided to choose Him Lam to open the campaign because it realized that this base had an insurmountable weakness. It was an unexpected location, located 2.5km from the Central Division. This distance allowed us to concentrate the necessary strength, isolating Him Lam for a certain period of time to destroy it. If the battle ended at night, the possibility of enemy reinforcements from the Central Division or neighboring bases could be eliminated. Practice has proven that the assessment and determination to attack Him Lam to open the campaign was correct. Winning the opening battle, quickly destroying the Him Lam stronghold cluster on the night of March 13 after just over 5 hours of fighting opened the way for our army to capture the entire Dien Bien Phu stronghold cluster.