Why can't Russian armor advance despite flat Ukrainian terrain?

When the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out three years ago, many analysts believed that the terrain in eastern and central Ukraine, consisting of endless plains and plains, would be very favorable for Russian mechanized infantry and armored forces to attack in a deep penetration style and fight in large formations.

But after three years of war, reality proved that the Russian army (RFAF) could not advance quickly, and the “steel flood” that the West feared, was defeated. So why did the RFAF have such difficulty fighting?

Still emphasizing the favorable terrain, without seeing the strength of the Ukrainian army (AFU), as well as the weapons and intelligence aid from the US and the West to Ukraine, shows a profound lack of understanding of this three-year war; like someone who only sees the trees, but does not see the forest.

Combat experience on the Russian-Ukrainian battlefield has proven that, on vast plains, conventional infantry can make it difficult for tanks to maneuver quickly; even the further they advance, the more damage they suffer.

As long as the defending side can build solid, interconnected defensive positions, arrange many barbed wire and dragon teeth fences; dig deep trenches, lay dense mines and deploy a large number of FPV UAVs... then there is an overall defense system.

In particular, by controlling the enemy's tactical air force and providing direct combat support to ground forces (especially armed helicopters, armed UAVs and attack aircraft), the infantry can still withstand large-scale armored and mechanized attacks. The terrain of eastern and central Ukraine is flat, but that does not mean that they cannot defend themselves and the enemy can advance freely.

When the Russo-Ukrainian war first broke out, some believed that eastern and central Ukraine was an endless plain, completely unsuitable for traditional infantry combat and guerrilla warfare. The RFAF’s “steel flood” would break through any AFU defenses.

In fact, Ukraine has plains, but also dense forests and many rivers. Eastern Ukraine in particular has a dense network of rivers and forests, with vast areas of wetlands and marshes.

Due to the flat terrain, the river water constantly washes and erodes the river banks, making the river bends more and more curved. The rivers in the Donbass and Kharkov regions form a special winding shape, which is the terrain of the horseshoe lakes. In terms of military , the terrain of these rivers and horseshoe lakes is not favorable for the maneuvering and fighting of mechanized forces.

The Ukrainian plain is full of obstacles that can hinder the advance of mechanized forces, and is very muddy for many months of the year. Apart from the fact that there are relatively few mountains, the terrain of Ukraine is by no means simple. To say that Ukraine is a flat and indefensible country is an overstatement.

For defensive positions like this in the plains, the AFU often dug makeshift trenches, running along roads and planted forests to block the wind; helping to connect between solid fire points, observation posts and fighting bunkers... Although there were no minefields, dragon teeth and anti-tank ditches, such positions could still cause difficulties for the attackers.

The combat experience on the Ukrainian battlefield has proven that light infantry can also effectively resist the fierce attacks of heavy armored forces. With the support of UAVs, artillery fire and anti-tank guided missiles (ATGM), trenches once again become an effective defense against large-scale mechanized attacks.

Even if simple fighting trenches (less than 2 meters deep) are dug, connected to gun emplacements and bunkers; interspersed with shelters (which can withstand shrapnel from artillery shells). In these positions, a full communication system (radio, wire, Starlink Internet network) is installed and dense mines are laid in front, it is still possible to effectively resist a large-scale attack by heavy mechanized forces.

However, during the height of mechanized warfare and the early days of the information warfare era, that is, during the 1991 Gulf War and the 2003 Iraq War, the armies of powerful countries rarely dug trenches.

In the past, trench warfare was considered an outdated tactic. The armies of major countries attached great importance to high-speed attacks and mobile offensive operations. This was true not only of the US army, but also of the Soviet and Chinese armies. The Russian army still inherited the tactics of the mechanized attack wave developed by the Soviet army.

The Russo-Ukrainian War was the deadliest war in terms of tank and armored vehicle losses since World War II, with a total of four to five thousand tanks destroyed by Russia and Ukraine. It has become a sad place for main battle tanks; many experts even believe that the days of the heavy main battle tank (MBT) are numbered.

Because the battlefield is filled with high-performance anti-tank missiles, high-precision long-range artillery, smart bombs with terminal guidance, dense minefields, and a large number of FPV UAVs, the tanks on the ground are like rabbits on the hunt. Any main battle tank that was once praised as extremely powerful, whether Russian or Western, was eventually blown to pieces, without exception.

Before the Russo-Ukrainian War, many people underestimated the power of “small but mighty” weapons such as anti-tank guided missiles (ATGMs), man-portable air defense missiles (MANPADs); especially small UAVs carrying single-use weapons (FPV UAVs). But it was these weapons that rewrote the tactical principles of all sides, both combatants and non-combatants.

Before the Russia-Ukraine conflict broke out, the military community in general never believed that small quadcopter UAVs, ATGMs or MANPADS could gain an advantage over powerful mechanized forces or airborne firepower; nor did they believe that light infantry could confront heavy armor. But three years after the Russia-Ukraine war, everyone believes it. (photo source: TASS, Sputnik, Kyiv Post, Ukrinform).

Source: https://khoahocdoisong.vn/tai-sao-thiet-giap-nga-khong-the-tien-du-dia-hinh-ukraine-bang-phang-post1542843.html