All for victory

For the historic Dien Bien Phu campaign to achieve complete victory, preparing forces and depleting enemy manpower on the battlefields was considered a particularly important "preparatory step".

All for victory Artillery entering the front lines (image displayed at the Dien Bien Phu Historical Victory Museum).

In Vietnamese military art, guerrilla warfare holds a crucial position. This was clearly demonstrated during the resistance against French colonial aggression. The Central Committee meeting in January 1948 set forth the operational principle: "Guerrilla warfare is the main focus, mobile warfare is supplementary." By January 1950, the Third National Conference of the Party determined that "developing guerrilla warfare to its maximum extent remains the main task at this time, but at the same time, we must focus on truly mobile warfare." And reality has proven that when the war enters the decisive stage in determining victory or defeat, conventional warfare becomes even more important.

It has been argued that without conventional warfare, guerrilla warfare itself cannot be sustained and developed. Conventional warfare is necessary to accomplish the strategic task of destroying the enemy, liberating territory, and protecting important rear areas. Based on this requirement, our Party resolutely and promptly shifted from guerrilla warfare to mobile warfare. Concentrated battalions and main regiments coordinated with guerrilla forces to launch operations, including small-scale campaigns targeting small enemy strongholds and small combat units. Over nearly four years (from 1947 to 1950) of launching guerrilla warfare and practicing concentrated combat tactics, we created new strength and advanced in all aspects. This included creating a system of interspersed and interlocking warfare to encircle, disperse, and pin down enemy forces on various battlefields. Simultaneously, we built and developed the three branches of the armed forces. The army organized strong regiments and divisions to launch larger-scale campaigns. By the first half of 1950, we had built two divisions, 308 and 304, and 14 main regiments. By early 1951, most of the main regiments in the North were concentrated into three infantry divisions, 312, 320, and 316, and the 351 Engineering-Artillery Division. This was an extremely important "capital" to ensure the victory of the Dien Bien Phu campaign later on.

Along with building up the main force as the "backbone," offensives aimed at depleting the enemy's strength and testing the combat capabilities of the main forces were conducted on many fronts. In September 1950, we launched an offensive against the enemy on the Sino-Vietnamese border, with the main attack targeting the Dong Khe stronghold (25km from Cao Bang town). For the first time, the General Staff concentrated one division and two main regiments, directly commanding a concentrated attack on a crucial strategic direction, destroying two elite European-African battalions of the French army, liberating land, and opening up the Sino-Vietnamese border. This is considered a typical and highly successful campaign in terms of mobile warfare and operational effectiveness, an outstanding campaign of annihilation, marking a leap forward in the concentrated combat capabilities of our main forces.

Nearly a year later, with active support from the US, the French colonial forces were working hard to restore and consolidate their strength. On November 18, 1951, they concentrated a large force to attack and capture Hoa Binh town and Highway 6, aiming to regain the initiative they had lost in the main battlefield of Northern Vietnam. Seizing the opportunity when the enemy no longer had mobile forces behind them, the Central Committee of the Party and the General Staff decided to launch a strategic counter-offensive, concentrating three main divisions to attack the enemy on the main front (Hoa Binh) to encircle, destroy, and contain them. At the same time, they used two divisions to infiltrate enemy territory behind enemy lines, along with local troops and the people, to intensify guerrilla warfare and launch a general offensive to eliminate collaborators and traitors in the midland and lowland areas of Northern Vietnam. The Hoa Binh counter-offensive marked a milestone in the development of the art of leadership, combining the two basic methods of armed struggle: guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare; coordinating main forces and local troops; and coordinating various battlefields. The military and civilians coordinated their efforts, allowing both guerrilla warfare and conventional warfare to develop strongly together.

Leveraging strategic initiative on the main battlefield, we continuously launched two campaigns in the mountainous jungle region. The Northwest Campaign (October 1952 to December 1952) in Nghia Lo and Phu Yen, on the left bank of the Da River, liberated 250,000 people, established a new base in the Northwest, connecting with Viet Bac, and strengthened the rear base of the resistance nationwide. The Upper Laos Campaign (April to June 1953), in which our army and the Pathet Lao army attacked the enemy in Sam Neua province, was the first large-scale campaign of the Vietnamese and Lao armies. After nearly a month of fighting, especially during the seven days and nights of pursuing enemy forces along a 270km stretch of rugged mountains and jungle, we and our allies achieved a great victory.

To facilitate the strategic decisive battle of Dien Bien Phu, our main units were assigned the task of launching a strategic offensive on the battlefields, with 5 offensive strikes: (1) In Lai Chau on December 10, 1953, our troops began attacking the town and forcing the enemy to retreat. After 15 days and nights of continuous fighting, we liberated the entire Lai Chau area, threatening Dien Bien Phu from the North. (2) In Central Laos, in the last week of December 1953, the Vietnam People's Army coordinated with the Lao liberation army to launch the offensive campaign at Xeno (Central Laos), destroying a part of the enemy's forces and attracting and dispersing their forces, creating conditions for another direction to attack and destroy the enemy. (3) In Upper Laos, in the last week of January 1954, our troops coordinated with the Lao liberation army to launch an offensive campaign against the enemy's defensive line in the Nam Hu River area. The enemy panicked and fled. Our army and the Lao liberation army continued to pursue the enemy to within 15km of Luang Prabang. (4) In Military Region V, the enemy decided to launch the Atlantic campaign with the aim of occupying the entire free zone of our country. The majority of the main army concentrated its attack in the main direction of Northeast Kon Tum, coordinating on Highway 19, liberating Kon Tum town, sweeping away enemy troops in the North Central Highlands down to Highway 19... (5) In Upper Laos, in the last week of January 1954, our army coordinated with the Lao liberation army to launch an offensive campaign against the enemy's defense line in the Nam Hu River area.

Along with the five strategic blows mentioned above, the activities of our army and people in the enemy's rear areas continuously developed. This was an unprecedentedly large-scale and coordinated battlefield in Indochina, foiling Nava's plan to concentrate mobile forces and forcing the enemy to disperse their strategic forces everywhere to counter us. This was also the necessary preparation for the historic confrontation at Dien Bien Phu. Then, in the last days of 1953 and the beginning of 1954, after many important initial victories, the Central Military Commission and the General Staff decided to deploy the remaining forces to conduct the Dien Bien Phu campaign according to the plan approved by the Politburo. On December 22, 1953, the 351st Division began its march. The 312th Division also left Yen Bai two days later. In early January 1954, the General Staff decided to deploy the 57th Regiment, 304th Division, to Dien Bien Phu. The 9th Regiment, 304th Division, was retained in Phu Tho as a reserve force to ensure the safety of the rear lines of the front.

All preparations for the campaign were complete, awaiting only the decisive moment - March 13, 1954 - when our troops would fire the first shot, attacking the enemy and burying their hegemonic ambitions right in the heart of the Dien Bien Phu basin.

Text and photos: Tran Hang

(This article uses material from the book "The Vietnamese Revolutionary War 1945-1975: Victories and Lessons").

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