The opportunity to launch a general military and political offensive on Saigon was ripe.

On April 22, 1975, the Politburo consulted on the development of the general offensive and uprising in the South; units received tasks and deployed preparations for the Ho Chi Minh Campaign.

On April 22, 1975, the Politburo held a meeting to discuss the development of the general offensive and uprising in the South. After that, First Secretary Le Duan called the Campaign Command, instructing: The US and puppets should find a way to delay our attack on Saigon, establish a new government, propose a ceasefire and seek a political solution to save the situation from complete defeat. The opportunity to launch a general military and political offensive on Saigon is ripe. We need to seize every day to promptly launch the attack. Action at this time is the surest guarantee for complete victory. If we delay, it will not be beneficial both militarily and politically...

On the same day, the Central Military Commission telegraphed to comrade Van Tien Dung - Commander of the Ho Chi Minh Campaign, stating: The enemy is delaying to find a way to propose a ceasefire, extending it into the rainy season... If Saigon cannot be held, they will retreat to the Mekong Delta, using Can Tho as the center... The Southwest direction and Route 4 are ready to block and destroy the enemy in the event that they retreat from Saigon to Can Tho.

In Ham Tan town, Binh Tuy province, the enemy troops, after retreating by ship and boat to the sea, thought that our forces were advancing southward, so they returned to occupy the town. On April 22, 1975, the 66th Regiment of the 304th Division of the 2nd Corps, reinforced by the 5th Armored Battalion, a 105th Artillery Battalion, an anti-aircraft artillery company, and the 9th Company of the 128th Regiment of the 325th Division, along with local forces, attacked and liberated Ham Tan town, destroying and disintegrating nearly 5,000 enemy troops clustered in the town.

Also in Binh Tuy, on April 22, 1975, Regiment 812 and other coordinated forces quickly captured the Lang Gon area. Local Company 88 used 60mm mortars to destroy the ammunition depot in Dong Den. Another attack force crossed the sea to defend Hon Ba Island (2km from the mainland).

On the same day, at the Eastern Wing Command, the Eastern Wing Command received the Ho Chi Minh Campaign mission from the Campaign Command's envoy. That same night, the Party Committee and the 2nd Corps Command met to study and thoroughly understand the mission and develop the Corps' operational plan for the Ho Chi Minh Campaign.

On April 22, 1975, Major General Hoang Cam - Commander and Major General Hoang The Thien - Political Commissar of the 4th Corps went to the Forward Command Post of the Ho Chi Minh Campaign Command in Gia Ray, reported the situation and approved the Corps' determination with Lieutenant General Le Trong Tan, Deputy Commander and Lieutenant General Le Quang Hoa, Deputy Political Commissar of the Campaign Command.

On the same day, at Dong De, the Truong Son Command convened an urgent meeting of the leaders of the subordinate units. Comrade Dong Sy Nguyen - Commander of the Truong Son Corps announced the preparations for the Ho Chi Minh Campaign, the general tasks of the Truong Son Corps and assigned specific tasks to each unit.

On April 22, 1975, with the technical assistance of specialists from the US Military Attaché Office (DAO), the enemy air force dropped CBU-55 bombs on the area where the Liberation Army was gathering in Xuan Loc. The bomb's destructive power cleared a large area, killing hundreds of people and burning down many houses and gardens of civilians in the outskirts of the town.

NDO

Source: https://baohanam.com.vn/chinh-tri/ngay-22-4-1975-thoi-co-de-mo-cuoc-tong-tien-cong-ve-quan-su-va-chinh-tri-vao-sai-gon-da-chin-muoi-158275.html