Behind the most important question of 1975 with Defense Intelligence

NDO - In the life of an intelligence officer, we have to answer many questions from our superiors. We have to obey any assignment unconditionally, but in 1975, for us, there was one mission, one most important question…! Colonel, Hero of the People's Armed Forces Nguyen Van Tau (Tu Cang), Head of the legendary H63 Intelligence Group, tells a story about his 50-year-old career.

Seated row, from left to right; 1- Lieutenant General Nguyen Nhu Van, former Director General of General Department II; 2- Comrade Tran Quoc Huong, former Secretary of the Party Central Committee, Head of the Central Internal Affairs Committee; 3- Comrade Tran Hieu, former Director General of Department II; 4- Lieutenant General Vu Chinh, former Director General of General Department II; 5- Major General Dang Tran Duc (Ba Quoc), Hero of the People's Armed Forces. Second row, left to right; 3- Major General Nguyen Van Khiem (Sau Tri), former Head of the Intelligence Department of Region J22; 4- Colonel Le Huu Thuy (Nam Thuy), Hero of the People's Armed Forces; 5- Major General Vu Ngoc Nha (Hoang Duc Nha), Hero of the People's Armed Forces. Third row, left to right; 1- Major General Pham Xuan An (Hai Trung), Hero of the People's Armed Forces

Absolutely comply, proactively create

"The most unique feature of the National Defense Intelligence is that it is placed under the absolute and direct leadership in all aspects of the Party, the direction of the Central Military Commission, and the Ministry of National Defense in all intelligence fields. The tasks, measures, and achievements of intelligence are all from the Party's policies and guidelines; once assigned, we must strive to complete them" - Lieutenant General Luu Duc Huy, former Director of General Department 2, confided about the crucial issues, difficult "tasks", and difficult tasks that the General Headquarters assigned to intelligence during the Resistance War against the US. That is, in terms of politics, we must grasp all plots, tricks, and the internal situation of the US; the political situation of the Republic of Vietnam. In terms of diplomacy, we must clearly understand the international support for the Vietnamese people; the anti-war movement in the US. In terms of economics, we must clearly understand the US economic and military aid; the spending of the Saigon government. In terms of military affairs, we must clearly understand the major strategies of the US-puppet; specific military plans...

"After 1973, the US was forced to withdraw its troops according to the Paris Agreement, but continued to provide military aid, sabotaging the Agreement with the strategy of "Vietnamizing the war". The "most important" question assigned to the intelligence networks of that period, including our H63 cluster, was: "Will the US send troops back when we fight a big war?"

Colonel Nguyen Van Tau (Tu Cang), Head of Intelligence Group H63, front row, second from right, participated in the takeover of Saigon after the liberation on April 30, 1975. Source: General Department II.

In July 1974, the J22 Intelligence Department obtained a report from the General Staff of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam on the planned plan for 1975, including special information: The level of US reinforcements on the southern battlefield; The level of difficulties in Saigon; US aid was cut; the Republic of Vietnam did not recruit enough soldiers... The information from Mr. Pham Xuan An, Ba Minh and many other spy networks allowed the National Defense Intelligence to confirm: In 1974, the enemy had to shrink and accept giving up land if lost. The revolutionary situation changed rapidly. Accurate forecasting and seizing opportunities were practical requirements.

From December 18, 1974 to January 8, 1975, the Politburo held an expanded conference and commented: "We are facing a great strategic opportunity... In addition to the basic two-year strategic plan 1975-1976...: If the opportunity comes in early or late 1975, then immediately liberate the South in 1975" (Chronicle of events of the Party's leadership of the military and national defense in the Vietnamese revolution (1930-2000) - Ministry of National Defense, War Summary Steering Committee. People's Army Publishing House - H.2021, p.290).

In January 1975, we captured Phuoc Long, the South was shaken, the enemy did not show any signs of determination to retake it like in Quang Tri 1972, the General Headquarters raised the question again: "If the puppet army is in danger of total collapse, will the US intervene militarily?". A correct answer will contribute to deciding the proactive solution: if the US intervenes, we will fight differently, if the US abandons the South, we will fight differently.

During those days of “one day equals twenty years”, Mr. Pham Xuan An quickly sent documents with 5-6 rolls of film to the base, including very important documents of the Strategic Research Board of the Saigon Government, chaired by General Nguyen Xuan Trien. The first time, Mr. An sent a summary. The second time was the original - the “essence” document (as Lieutenant General Luu Duc Huy often used). The research sent to President Nguyen Van Thieu affirmed: “The US Army will not return to the South. The 7th Fleet will not return to the East Sea. The US will not use B52 bombers in the Indochina battlefield. The US continues to cut aid budget for the Republic of Vietnam, including defense." In particular, the document clearly states that the weakest and most difficult place to protect is the Central Highlands battlefield, Tactical Zone 2. In Tactical Zone 2, the most dangerous battlefield is Buon Ma Thuot. If the communists attack Buon Ma Thuot, the entire Central Highlands defense system will collapse and must retreat to defend in the plains! - Colonel Tu Cang commented: "Learning from the experience of the Korean War, when the Chinese-Korean army poured into southern Korea, the US 7th Fleet immediately intervened. Is the US like that now? In response to the above question, we ask you to find out and answer responsibly. Because the impact of the question has strategic significance, it will help us proactively fight to win, minimizing our casualties and losses."

The decision of the Politburo and the Central Military Commission to attack Buon Ma Thuot in March 1975 shattered the enemy's position at its "weakest" point. The next problem is that when we concentrated our efforts to liberate the South, what would happen if the US returned? News from many sources shows that the biggest concern of the US at that time was not the danger of the Republic of Vietnam but "the honor of the United States". And that was the content of the telegram that US President G. Ford replied to President of the Republic of Vietnam Nguyen Van Thieu after the fall of Buon Ma Thuot. The problem is how to get that top secret content?

The Politburo's final decision on the General Offensive to liberate the South was the result of a synthesis of many sources of information, intelligence, and skillful military art, but an important role was also played by an intelligence officer deep within the enemy. Comrade Nguyen Van Minh (aka H3) was responsible for receiving and storing incoming and outgoing documents between the Office of the Puppet General Staff and the Presidential Palace, the agencies of the Ministry of National Defense, and the military regions. For more than 10 years working as a typist at the Puppet General Staff, there were secret documents known to only 5 people, except for him, the other 4 were top-ranking. The trust of the generations of Chiefs of the General Staff with him was exceptional: he was the only sergeant major allowed into the General Staff's office without prior permission. That "lowly" sergeant major was the one who accessed the top secret telegram from President G. Ford sent to President Nguyen Van Thieu, copied to Puppet General Staff Chief Cao Van Vien, and quickly transferred it to the General Headquarters. The news at the decisive moment contributed to the confirmation of two key issues; "When we attack Saigon, the US will not directly participate in the war again" and "The US considers the war in Vietnam to have ended, the US will not support the puppet army with US combat forces" (top secret report). With many achievements and feats, he was awarded the rank of Intelligence Colonel and in 1999, H3 - Nguyen Van Minh was awarded the title of Hero of the People's Armed Forces by the Party and State.

Intelligence Colonel, Hero of the People's Armed Forces Nguyen Van Minh (Ba Minh, also known as H3), was placed in the office of the General Staff of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam and provided much valuable strategic intelligence information to serve the General Offensive and Uprising in the spring of 1975.

Source: General Department II.

On April 30, 1975, when the liberation army entered the Puppet General Staff, H3 was extremely moved. The diligent sergeant, with his own talent for arranging documents so that the 'boss' could have them when he needed them, and call them; for many years he had created for himself a cover of a person who was addicted to lottery, who in his free time wrote poems, guessed dreams, joys and sorrows, ate, slept, stayed up late, and stayed at the office because of his "addiction to lottery", now quietly changed into civilian clothes, filled with an indescribable joy. "It's been decades... That feeling is so great... Now I've escaped the danger zone. I'm happy but I can't share it with anyone." That was also the state of mind of the famous Saigon journalist Pham Xuan An when he saw off his "informed sources" who were fleeing in panic during the death throes of the regime he had so faithfully "served" publicly, and together with his teammates, contributed to its collapse from within with top secret reports - "My mission was technically over, the country was unified and the Americans had left, but I could not reveal the truth to anyone." (X6 Perfect Spy, Hong Duc Publishing House, reprinted, supplemented in 2013, p. 282).

"Always rely on the people and stay close to the enemy", determined "considered dead"

“In this PROFESSION, training 100 people to go, having 10 people stay, climbing high and doing well in their positions is also a victory. There are times when the net is broken, causing heavy losses, then we have to rebuild from the people. Intelligence based on people is a vital issue, a unique feature of Vietnam! The most important thing in the intelligence profession is absolute loyalty to the Party and the intelligence organization. You must have absolute faith in the inevitable victory of the revolution. You must be clever and creative in your activities. You must be ready to sacrifice for the mission” - Lieutenant General Luu Duc Huy shared.

In Colonel Tu Cang's memory, from an order about intelligence situation, his network proactively learned and excellently completed the order given above. “In the first phase of Mau Than 1968, we suffered heavy losses. In the second phase, the Deputy Commander of the Northern Army, Tam Ha, suddenly wavered and surrendered. Mr. Sau Tri (Major General Nguyen Van Khiem), Head of the Intelligence Department of Region J22, asked me: “A high-ranking officer of ours has just surrendered. You must go to Saigon immediately to find the confession and see what he has to say.” I returned to the city to meet Mr. An, a spy under the cover of a journalist for TIME. Mr. An said, “You wait for me to meet the contact, but you can only see it for 15 minutes because it is top secret.” The confession was more than 20 pages. After taking the photo, he invited me to the Continental Hotel to “see if the Americans know that he has surrendered and how he reacted.” I sat and waited at the Givral cafe for about 20 minutes, then he came and said: “Is there something interesting, Mr. Tu?” - What? “Over there, we know that this guy has “surrendered”! But he said, “The Viet Cong are ready to fight.” The second wave" made the US President "confused", meaning "if we let the Viet Cong attack in the second wave, we can only negotiate and withdraw!". The "confusion" was worth a lot! Tam Ha returned "first" on April 19, and on April 20, I received the order and sent it home the next day. Mr. Sau Tri praised it as "very timely!". In terms of assessment, intelligence had advised on two issues: first, attacking strongly in Mau Than would weaken the US's will to invade, and if the US wanted to "give up", the Saigon government would no longer have a support. Second, from Mr. An's information and the nets about the enemy's intention to set a trap for a "reverse Dien Bien Phu", the Central Military Commission directed "counter-strategy" to carry out the "fake Dien Bien Phu" diversionary campaign, that we would not focus on attacking urban areas and plains, but only attack in mountainous areas to draw the enemy's main force away from the cities when we launched a general attack and uprising...

“This is not the work of any one person. The Party has looked far ahead, built up the force, built up the people's trust so that intelligence can be protected and work” - Colonel Tu Cang confided - “Uncle Ho sent a letter to the intelligence during the war against the French saying that intelligence is the “eyes and ears” of the Party, “must always rely on the people and go close to the enemy”. “Relying on the people is doing mass mobilization, going close to the enemy to grasp the enemy must accept sacrifice” - Mr. Tu pointed his finger at his chest. “I tell you guys, when you join this unit, you must write four words on your chest! “What words, Uncle Tu?”, he said: “Consider him dead!”. Once the base reported to me: “The liaison Tu Lam was captured in Hoc Mon. Must move immediately!” I said: “This guy is willing to die but definitely won’t confess! But in principle, you have to go to protect the line. As for me, I trust Tu Lam! Don’t have two grenades here, if he brings soldiers back, I will share one with him, and keep one for me. If an officer or a cluster leader dies, the superiors will replace him, but the people inside, the secret network, must be protected to the end! After 1975, I went to Phu Quoc to burn incense for Tu Lam. He was tortured to death but refused to confess.

In 2006, there was a meeting of the entire intelligence sector, General Nguyen Chi Vinh told me "Uncle Tu reported on the Party and political work in a cluster". I said: My unit has been operating from the beginning to the end without losing contact for a single day! Those who were arrested all accepted death rather than confess. That is the Party's principle!

In the exclusive full interview of Media 21, “Part 1; Stories from the enemy’s rear”, published on March 29, 2025, the late Senior Lieutenant General Nguyen Chi Vinh, former Director General of General Department 2, choked up when talking about People’s Armed Forces Hero Nguyen Van Thuong- Hai Thuong - “They promised him a lot, but he did not confess. In the end, they sawed off his leg! Each saw was a live saw, no anesthesia, only anesthesia so he could feel the pain! Sawed with a carpenter’s saw, not a medical saw! Six times like that”!

Intelligence courier, Major, People's Armed Forces Hero Nguyen Van Thuong (Hai Thuong), was captured by the enemy, tortured, had his legs amputated 6 times, but remained steadfast and refused to confess.

Photo taken in 2022 Source - General Department II

Hearing me ask, maintaining the principle of “secrecy, single line, distance” in the enemy’s heart, even with comrades and fellow countrymen, what did he think about the protection and care of the people, Colonel Tu Cang fell silent, then said: “I came from Cu Chi to the city, staying at the base house. His hometown is in Noi Due commune, Bac Ninh province. At night, lying down and confiding, he said, “I know you came here to make a revolution! To tell the truth, my capital was 36 million - at that time 3,000 dong/tael of gold. If the enemy captured you in the house, everything would be gone! But don’t worry, do you hear! Because I love the revolution, I love you!”. At night, I talked to him about the revolution, about Uncle Ho, and massaged him when he was in pain. People’s war, we must live in a way that the people truly love, protect, and care for us!

Glorious tradition, the next step

The Party and people's long-term resistance war against the US to save the country has recorded the great contribution of the National Defense Intelligence. Thanks to early identification of the nature and plot of the US imperialists, we promptly prepared and brought a large number of elite cadres to the southern battlefield, together with local forces, to quickly build and develop methods, forces, and solid inter-connected positions, and to build many cadres to penetrate deeply and climb high into the key agencies and brains of the US-Puppet. From there, we have collected a lot of strategically valuable information such as; the plot to sabotage the General Election according to the Geneva Agreement; the US plot to oust France; the strategy of 'Special War', 'Local War', 'Vietnamization of the War', the plan to "denounce Communists and destroy Communists", establish strategic hamlets, the annual AB plan; the plans for military operations, counterattacks and withdrawal of US and vassal troops from the south...

Comrade Pham Xuan An (Hai Trung) - Major General, Hero of the People's Armed Forces, far right, when a TIME magazine reporter was interviewing the three-star General, Commander of the 3rd Tactical Zone of the Puppet Army during a military operation in 1968

Source: General Department II

“The final victory comes from the leadership of the Party, from the intelligence and blood of our army and people, from all forces and fronts, including the great and silent sacrifices of Vietnam's Defense Intelligence, from strategic intelligence; technical reconnaissance; military reconnaissance; agencies that receive, research, analyze and process information; technical logistics to ensure… Lieutenant General Luu Duc Huy shared.

In the book X6 Perfect Spy, historian Larry Berman recounts that President Duong Van Minh himself admitted that "he was not surprised that the North won this war because the intelligence team helped them update full information" (Sdd, p. 272).

Fifty years after the reunification of the country, the North and South are united as one, the glorious tradition of being a particularly reliable support in providing information, researching and proposing advice, ensuring information to the Party and State leaders as soon as possible, most promptly, most deeply, most accurately, absolutely not being passive or surprised about strategy, has always been a source of pride, a stepping stone for the National Defense Intelligence to continuously develop, improve, and elevate, contributing worthily to the cause of building and firmly protecting the socialist Vietnamese homeland from early on, from afar in all circumstances, against all enemies.

Nhandan.vn

Source: https://nhandan.vn/phia-sau-cau-hoi-quan-trong-nhat-nam-1975-voi-tinh-bao-quoc-phong-post870780.html