Dien Bien Phu Campaign: On April 9, 1954, we shot down a C119 aircraft.

Our 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns shot down the C119 aircraft. This was the first enemy twin-fuselage aircraft shot down by our forces at Dien Bien Phu.

On the enemy side: On the night of April 9th, the enemy reinforced their forces with the 2nd Parachute Legion Battalion. Due to the rain, this battalion was only able to reach two companies and a section of the command headquarters.

At 5:30 AM, the enemy concentrated their forces for a counterattack, attempting to retake the C1 stronghold. The fighting between our forces and the enemy was fierce. Each side occupied half of the stronghold.

Muong Thanh airfield was shelled by our troops during the Dien Bien Phu Campaign. (Photo courtesy of VNA)

The offensive, sniping, and parachute capture movements completely transformed the face of the central command post. The enemy's lives were constantly tense, lacking everything. Wounded enemy soldiers were piled up in cramped bunkers, lacking supplies and medicine. French and Western journalists called it "living next to death," "living in a corner of hell." Later, in the chapter on "The Suffocating Command Post" in his book "History of the Indochina War," French General Y. Gras recounted the following:

"...From April 9th, the logistical situation of the fortified complex became critical. The requirement was to replenish 200 tons of ammunition per day, but the maximum that could be dropped was only 145 tons, of which the French only managed to recover a maximum of 100 tons. Supply aircraft suffered average losses of 15 to 20%. Resupplying the fortified complex became a veritable aerial operation under the extremely unfavorable weather conditions of the mountainous jungle battlefield..."

"...The most worrying thing is that the parachute drop zone (mainly located between the central area and Hong Cum) has been shrinking like a dried piece of leather. Only about 100 hectares remain, almost entirely under enemy infantry fire..."

"...Collecting the scattered packages thrown onto the ground required a large workforce. That alone was a daunting task. Thus, the Dien Bien Phu fortified complex was strangled not by the impact of enemy air defenses, but primarily by the activities of the Viet Minh divisions on the ground, right next to the French positions. These divisions did not use a massive offensive but spent three weeks continuously encircling and tightening their grip on the garrison within a square area of ​​1 km on each side. Each stronghold was tightly wrapped in a system of trenches, like an insect caught in a spider's web. The position became isolated, blockaded, and quickly strangled due to a lack of ammunition, food, and especially water."

- On our side: Our 12.7mm anti-aircraft guns shot down a C119 aircraft. This was the first enemy twin-fuselage aircraft shot down by our forces at Dien Bien Phu.

One of the 62 French aircraft shot down by our air defenses bursts into flames over Dien Bien Phu. (Archival photo/VNA)

According to the book "Complete Works of General Hoang Van Thai," General Hoang Van Thai recounted: On the morning of April 9, 1954, officers returned to their units with renewed enthusiasm. The results of the second phase of the preliminary review conference quickly translated into positive action by all units. And it was precisely with these important results that our army achieved victories in the political and ideological education campaign against right-wing negativity organized by the Party Committee at the end of April.

Immediately after the front's preliminary review conference, we organized a conference of the chiefs of staff of the divisions and regiments to assess the achievements and responsibilities of the staff branch in the recent fighting. All the staff officers acknowledged their responsibility for the shortcomings of the officers and units. Specifically for the campaign staff, reality increasingly showed that we needed to pay more attention to guiding and assisting the units with specific tactical issues for the troops, especially given the many new challenges arising in this first large-scale positional offensive in the history of our Army.

We paid close attention to the experience of the 36th Regiment in using the method of advancing with small units to destroy position 106. The soldiers had positioned mountain artillery at Kéo village, gradually destroying enemy gun emplacements and bunkers on the outer perimeter of position 106, then suddenly stormed the fort. Over a hundred enemy soldiers were caught off guard. Our troops quickly took control of the position.

A 12.7mm artillery position fired at enemy aircraft supplying the Dien Bien Phu fortified complex. (Photo courtesy of VNA)

The main issue we discussed at this Chiefs of Staff meeting was how to help units overcome recent tactical shortcomings. The upcoming tasks for the divisions were defined by the Campaign Command in the directive dated April 10th. Based on the assigned tasks and an analysis of the specific enemy situation within each division's area of ​​responsibility, as well as the actual situation of the units, the issue we raised for discussion was how to apply appropriate tactics to limit the enemy's strengths, exploit their weaknesses, and minimize our casualties. Along with discussing the task of continuing to develop the encirclement and attack, we exchanged many ideas on tactics of infiltration, sniping, directing "heroic" teams to penetrate deep into enemy territory for surprise attacks, organizing forces, and directing continuous day and night combat operations. We also discussed how to make the most of the training time for newly recruited soldiers, especially in the four areas of individual tactical skills, in order to regularly and promptly correct the continuous combat force; how to build a solid defensive position on the high ground we had captured in the East… all the issues discussed were aimed at preparing the conditions for the final offensive.

Following the conference, based on thorough discussions of the task of threatening the airfield and controlling enemy airspace, we exchanged ideas with Comrade Vuong Thua Vu and Comrade Le Trong Tan regarding preparations to destroy position 105, launch attacks on positions 206 and 311, and engage enemy reinforcements from both the East and West directions. Through these discussions and from the practical experience of the 36th Regiment in destroying position 106, as well as the experience of destroying several enemy barricades and bunkers at positions 105 and 206, the concept of using small units to "attack aggressively" in fortified positions with a battlefield nature became increasingly clear and theoretically sound in our thinking. With the results of the staff conference and the approval of the Campaign Command, we concluded the operation.

(excerpt)

1. General Vo Nguyen Giap: Complete Collection of Memoirs, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi , 2010.

2. General Hoang Van Thai: Complete Works, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2007.

3. The Dien Bien Phu Campaign - Events and Figures/Nguyen Van Thiet - Le Xuan Thanh, People's Army Publishing House, Hanoi, 2014.

4. Dien Bien Phu - Seen from Two Sides, Thanh Nien Publishing House, 2004.

5. Dien Bien Phu - A Historical Rendezvous/Memoirs of General Vo Nguyen Giap, written by author Huu Mai, Information and Communications Publishing House, 2018.

According to the People's Army Newspaper

Source: https://baolaocai.vn/chien-dich-dien-bien-phu-ngay-941954-ta-ban-roi-chiec-may-bay-c119-post382560.html