Editor 's Note : To commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Liberation of Phu Yen Province ( April 1 , 1975 - April 1 , 2025 ) and the Liberation of Southern Vietnam and National Reunification ( April 30 , 1975 - April 30 , 2025 ) , Phu Yen Newspaper presents to readers articles aimed at reviewing the arduous and heroic period of struggle by the entire Party , army , and people under the leadership of the Party .At the same time , we continue to affirm the great contributions of the army and people of Phu Yen , along with the whole country , to the great victory of Spring 1975 , unifying the country .
The Central Highlands Campaign (March 4-April 3, 1975), the opening blow in the 1975 Spring Offensive and Uprising, marked a turning point that changed the course of the war. The campaign's success affirmed the correct leadership of the Central Committee of the Party, marked a significant leap forward in the maturity of the Southern Liberation Army, and led to the rapid decline of the Saigon army and government.
Maintain a firm commitment to the offensive strategy .
At that time, the Central Highlands covered an area of approximately 60,000 km² , comprising the provinces of Kon Tum , Pleiku, Phu Bon, Dak Lak, and part of Quang Duc province; it was considered by the French as the "roof of Indochina." Whoever controlled this area would control Indochina. Replacing the French colonialists, the US imperialists paid even more attention to this strategic military position. The US and the Saigon government intensified many measures to suppress the ethnic minorities and prevent the revolutionary movement in the Central Highlands. However, with their indomitable spirit, the army and people of the Central Highlands continuously fought, gradually defeating the enemy's schemes and acts of aggression. Especially, the victory in northern the Central Highlands in 1972 contributed to the decisive blow, forcing the US to sign the Paris Agreement, ending the war and restoring peace in Vietnam.
Nevertheless, the US continued to secretly provide military aid and urge the Saigon government to sabotage the Paris Agreement, plotting to permanently divide our country. Faced with this situation, in July 1973, the Central Committee of the Party held its 21st Conference, clearly stating: The path forward for the revolution in the South is the path of violent revolution. Regardless of the circumstances, we must seize opportunities and maintain the strategic offensive line...
In March 1974, the Central Military Commission met and decided to vigorously build up the armed forces, especially the main army units, gradually improving their combat and annihilation capabilities. Accordingly, from the end of 1973 to 1974, all battlefields throughout South Vietnam shifted to resolute counter-offensives and offensives, defeating the enemy's schemes to seize land and control the population. In the Central Highlands, we captured the bases of Chu Nghe, Mang Den, Mang But, etc., expanding the liberated zone west of Highway 14 and north of Kon Tum town.
Entering the spring-summer of 1975, the Politburo , specifically the Central Military Commission, decided to launch the Central Highlands Campaign, aiming to destroy a significant portion of the enemy's forces, liberate the provinces of Dak Lak, Phu Bon, and Quang Duc, and create a new strategic position on the battlefield throughout Southern Vietnam. The campaign command was headed by Lieutenant General Hoang Minh Thao as Commander, with Colonel Dang Vu Hiep as Political Commissar. The forces participating in the campaign included 5 divisions (10, 320, 316, 3, 968) and 4 infantry regiments, 1 special forces regiment and 2 special forces battalions, 2 artillery regiments, 1 tank and armored vehicle regiment, and 3 anti-aircraft artillery regiments.
At this time, the Saigon government believed that in 1975, they were not strong enough to attack towns and cities; if they did attack, it would only be in the northern part of the Central Highlands. Even if they captured the area, they wouldn't be able to hold it if the enemy counterattacked and recaptured it. Therefore, with forces including the 23rd Infantry Division, 7 commando battalions, 36 security battalions, 1 artillery brigade, 230 artillery pieces, and 1 air force division, the Saigon army concentrated on defending Pleiku and Kon Tum. The enemy forces in Buon Ma Thuot were not strong, mostly consisting of rear-echelon troops of the division and regiment; the further inland they went, the thinner the enemy forces became. In the Central Highlands battlefield, Buon Ma Thuot town was the location of the headquarters of the 23rd Division of the Saigon army and the provincial capital of Dak Lak. This area is located at a strategic crossroads, with Highway 21 connecting Nha Trang and Highway 14, leading to Cheo Reo and Pleiku in the north, and Gia Nghia and the southeastern region in the south. Liberating Buon Ma Thuot gave us control of an extremely important strategic area for development in all directions, cutting off the Central Highlands from other regions, controlling the enemy, and gaining greater initiative. Furthermore, Buon Ma Thuot became a symbol of the stability of the Saigon government in the Central Highlands and the entire South.
Based on an analysis of the battlefield's advantages and disadvantages, the Politburo, the Central Military Commission, and the General Staff decided to choose Buon Ma Thuot as the strategic breakthrough point to launch the Central Highlands Campaign. To implement this decision, General Vo Nguyen Giap proposed two plans for attacking Buon Ma Thuot: If the enemy had not reinforced their forces, attack immediately. If the enemy reinforced their forces in Buon Ma Thuot, lure them out, then attack the reinforcements and annihilate them in Cam Ga and Thuan Man. In both cases, a diversionary tactic had to be carried out in the Tri-Thien, Kon Tum, and Pleiku directions.
The Saigon army 's retreat
On March 4, 1975, after a series of diversionary maneuvers aimed at drawing Saigon's army toward Pleiku and Kon Tum, the Central Highlands campaign officially commenced with a strategic offensive. The 95A Regiment was ordered to cut off traffic on Highway 19, destroying several checkpoints and completely securing a 20km stretch. Simultaneously, the 320th Division attacked and cut off Highway 14 in the northern Cam Ga area, severing control of the northern and southern Central Highlands. On Highway 21, the 25th Regiment carried out an attack to cut off the road east of Chu Cuc. This resulting cutoff completely severed communication between Quy Nhon and Pleiku-Kon Tum, and between Nha Trang and Buon Ma Thuot. The attacks by the Central Highlands Liberation Army drew most of the enemy forces toward Kon Tum and Pleiku. On March 9, 1975, our troops launched an attack to eliminate the enemy in Duc Lap, aiming to draw more attention from the Saigon army towards this direction.
After deploying forces to encircle the enemy, the combined arms force, with its four main prongs, combined with elite units and secret infantry battalions, secretly infiltrated and positioned themselves, bypassing the outer outposts, and using large-scale force to attack directly into the town center, crushing the headquarters of the 23rd Division of the Saigon army and the headquarters of the Dak Lak Sub-district. On the morning of March 10, 1975, our troops launched the attack on Buon Ma Thuot. Our special forces and artillery opened fire on Hoa Binh airport, the rear base of the 53rd Regiment, Buon Ma Thuot town airport, and the Mai Hac De warehouse area. Operational artillery units relentlessly shelled the headquarters of the 23rd Division of the Saigon army, the headquarters of the Dak Lak Sub-district, and the armored vehicle area. By the afternoon of March 10, we had captured most of the town. At this point, the Saigon government finally realized that Buon Ma Thuot was our main direction of attack. On the morning of March 11th, our troops attacked from all directions, capturing the headquarters of the 23rd Division and other remaining targets, gaining complete control of Buon Ma Thuot town. The Saigon government organized the 23rd Division along with remnants of the 53rd Regiment and the 21st Special Forces Brigade to launch a counterattack in an attempt to retake Buon Ma Thuot, but their efforts were completely crushed by the Liberation Army.
From March 15th, after two major defeats in Buon Ma Thuot, the Saigon government decided to withdraw from Kon Tum and Pleiku, relocating troops to the central coastal plains. A strategic retreat by the Saigon army began. The liberation forces pursued and annihilated almost all of the retreating enemy forces at Cheo Reo and Cung Son. In coordination with the main offensive, the armed forces attacked and liberated An Khe (March 12th), Kon Tum and Pleiku (March 17th), Kien Duc (March 20th), and Gia Nghia (March 22nd). After gaining control of the Central Highlands (March 24th), the troops continued to advance southward along the Central Coast along Highways 19, 7, and 21, liberating Binh Khe, Phu Yen, Nha Trang, and Cam Ranh. On April 3, 1975, the Central Highlands Campaign ended in victory. We annihilated and dispersed the 2nd Corps and 2nd Military Region of the Saigon army, eliminating more than 28,000 enemy soldiers from combat, capturing and destroying 154 aircraft, 1,096 military vehicles, and 17,188 weapons of various types...
Through skillful maneuvering and deception, the Central Highlands Campaign destroyed and dismantled a large defensive group, liberated a crucial area, directly threatened the coastal defense line of Central Vietnam, and marked the beginning of the end for the Saigon regime.
| The decisive battle to capture Buon Ma Thuot triggered a chain reaction, contributing to a rapid shift in the battlefield situation, opening up the opportunity for a strategic general offensive, creating a decisive turning point, and bringing the resistance war against the US to a swift and victorious end. In that sense, the Central Highlands Campaign was truly a devastating blow to the Saigon army in the Spring 1975 General Offensive and Uprising. |
(ND)
Source: https://baophuyen.vn/76/326441/chien-dich-tay-nguyen-nghe-thuat-nghi-binh-trong-cuoc-tong-tien-cong-va-noi-day-mua-xuan-1975.html
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